Trump's Coal Military Order: Why the Economics Don't Work

On Wednesday, February 12, 2025, President Trump stood in front of the Washington Coal Club and received a trophy labeling him the "Undisputed Champion of Clean, Beautiful Coal." He used the moment to announce yet another attempt at rescuing the coal industry: an executive order requiring the Department of Defense to sign long-term power purchase agreements with coal-fired power plants. This move is part of a broader strategy to revive coal power by making the military a guaranteed customer, as reported by E&E News.

The announcement sounds straightforward. The military needs electricity. Coal plants need customers. Why not force them together? But when you examine the actual energy economics, the grid reliability data, and the operational needs of the Department of Defense, the entire premise falls apart. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, coal is one of the most expensive sources of electricity, making it an impractical choice for military bases that require cost-effective energy solutions.

This isn't a story about political ideology. It's about basic math.

TL; DR

• Coal is expensive: Coal is the second-most expensive electricity source on the U.S. grid, beaten only by nuclear power per some metrics, but vastly more expensive than natural gas, wind, and solar. The economic analysis of advanced coal technologies highlights these cost disparities.
• Environmental costs are real: Coal produces more pollution per megawatt-hour than any other source, including carbon dioxide, particulates, and toxic ash. The environmental impact of coal has been well-documented, showing significant contributions to air pollution and climate change.
• Reliability is overstated: Coal plants fail regularly—Texas grid operators have documented coal outages contributing to major grid stress. A recent winter storm highlighted the unreliability of coal during critical periods.
• Military already buys cheaper power: Defense facilities currently procure power at market rates; forced long-term coal contracts would lock in higher costs for a decade or more. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities argues for an energy system that is affordable, safe, and reliable, which coal does not support.
• The order's justification contradicts reality: Trump's claims about cost savings and environmental improvements don't align with actual energy data. The American Institute of Physics provides insights into the scientific community's skepticism about coal's viability.

The Executive Order's Basic Premise

The executive order itself is brief and functional. It instructs the Secretary of Defense (referred to in the order as the "Secretary of War," a throwback title not used officially since 1947) to "seek to procure power from the United States coal generation fleet by approving long-term Power Purchase Agreements, or entering into any similar contractual agreements, with coal-fired energy production facilities to serve Department of War installations or other mission-critical facilities."

On its surface, this sounds like simple procurement policy. The Department of Defense operates over 300,000 buildings across all U.S. states and territories. Those buildings consume electricity. Coal plants exist. Make them do business together.

The reality is more complicated. Military bases don't operate in isolation. They're connected to regional electrical grids. They have varying power demands depending on mission requirements. They have existing contracts, infrastructure, and efficiency programs. Forcing them into long-term coal agreements disrupts all of that.

Moreover, the order arrives with justifications that don't withstand scrutiny. Trump stated at the coal club event that coal "is going to be less expensive and actually much more effective than what we have been using for many, many years" and that "with the environmental progress that's been made on coal, it's going to be just as clean." Neither claim is accurate, as noted by Florida Voice News.

Coal's True Cost on the American Grid

Start with the economics. This is where the order's premise crumbles immediately.

Coal is not cheap. The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is the standard metric used to compare different energy sources on equal footing. It accounts for construction costs, operating expenses, fuel costs, and the expected lifespan of the facility.

For coal, the current LCOE typically ranges from

• Natural gas:
  $35 to$
  70/MWh
• Wind (onshore):
  $25 to$
  60/MWh
• Solar (utility-scale):
  $20 to$
  50/MWh
• Nuclear:
  $100 to$
  200/MWh (highest upfront capital, but runs for 60+ years)

Coal isn't the cheapest option. It's beaten by renewables and natural gas in nearly every market in the country. The only reason aging coal plants still operate at all is because they've already been paid for—their construction costs are sunk. But new long-term contracts for coal power? Those are fundamentally uncompetitive. The EIA's short-term energy outlook confirms these cost comparisons.

The Department of Defense has a budget constraint like any organization. Every dollar spent on overpriced coal electricity is a dollar not spent on readiness, personnel, training, or modernization. A 10-year power purchase agreement with a coal plant locking in

That's not clean spending. That's just spending.

The Environmental Toll That Nobody's Addressing

Then there's the environmental question. Trump claimed that coal has made environmental progress and that it's now "just as clean" as other sources. This is where the disconnect from reality becomes almost bewildering.

Coal produces:

Carbon Dioxide: Coal emits roughly 820 grams of CO2 per kilowatt-hour. Natural gas produces about 490 grams. Wind and solar produce near-zero emissions during operation. The difference isn't marginal.

Particulate Matter: Coal combustion releases particulates that damage respiratory systems. These particles (PM 2.5 and smaller) penetrate deep into lung tissue. The American Lung Association estimates that coal pollution causes over 13,000 premature deaths annually in the U.S. There's no equivalently harmful emission from natural gas or renewables.

Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxides: Coal releases compounds that create acid rain and ozone, damaging ecosystems and infrastructure. Modern coal plants have scrubbers that reduce some of this pollution, but the reduction is incomplete, and the technology adds cost.

Coal Ash: When coal burns, it leaves behind ash containing arsenic, mercury, selenium, and other toxic metals. The U.S. generates about 125 million tons of coal ash annually. Much of it ends up in disposal ponds, some of which leak into groundwater.

No technology has made coal "clean." Certain technologies have made it less dirty. That's a crucial distinction.

For a military that's supposed to project power globally and respond to climate-related security threats, locking into a 10-year coal procurement strategy seems strategically incoherent. Climate change affects base operations. Rising sea levels threaten coastal installations. Extreme heat impacts training and readiness. Choosing coal doesn't address these challenges.

The Reliability Argument: Baseload Power Myth

The executive order justifies the coal mandate by highlighting coal's "proven reliability" and its ability to provide "continuous, on-demand baseload power." This argument has become a staple of coal advocacy, but it conflicts with recent operational data.

Baseload power is electricity that's available consistently, around the clock, independent of weather or time of day. Coal plants can run continuously for months at a time. That's true. But reliability means different things depending on context.

Texas Grid Stress and Coal Failures

Texas provides the most recent, concrete example of coal's unreliability. During the winter of 2024-2025, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) experienced multiple periods of grid stress. Coal plants contributed significantly to operational problems.

Here's what happened: Several coal plants went offline simultaneously. Some were undergoing maintenance. Others were affected by equipment failures. A few experienced operational issues related to extreme weather. Unlike natural gas plants, which can ramp up or down relatively quickly, coal plants take hours to restart once they've been shut down. When you lose 500 MW of coal capacity suddenly, you can't replace it instantly.

During one particularly stressed evening, ERCOT called on consumers to reduce demand. Coal plants that were supposed to provide reliable baseload power were instead creating grid problems.

This isn't an isolated incident. Coal plant outages happen regularly. The data from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) shows that coal plants have forced outage rates between 2% and 6% at any given time. That might sound small, but when you're designing a grid to keep the lights on for 330 million people, even 2% failures matter.

Renewables and Battery Storage: New Baseload Alternatives

Moreover, the concept of "baseload power" is becoming less relevant. Battery storage technology has matured dramatically. A 4-hour battery system (common for utility-scale installations) can provide on-demand power just like a coal plant, but it can charge during periods of low demand or excess renewable generation.

Texas is also deploying massive amounts of wind and solar, complemented by battery storage. When the grid needs firm power immediately, it can deploy stored energy within milliseconds. A coal plant that takes 4 hours to start up can't match that responsiveness.

The military's mission-critical facilities do need reliable power. But forcing them to rely on aging coal infrastructure that breaks down regularly is the opposite of ensuring reliability.

What the Military Actually Needs (And What It Currently Gets)

The Department of Defense operates under strict operational requirements. Mission-critical facilities—command centers, research labs, hospital systems—cannot tolerate grid failures. Failure isn't acceptable.

Currently, military installations maintain resilience through several mechanisms:

Grid Connection Diversity: Many bases are connected to multiple electrical substations, so a failure in one feed doesn't shut down the entire base.

On-Site Generation: Many installations have backup generators, often powered by natural gas or diesel fuel, that activate if grid power fails.

Renewable Integration with Storage: Increasingly, military bases are installing solar arrays paired with battery systems. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii, for example, is deploying significant renewable capacity with battery backup specifically to reduce vulnerability.

Microgrid Technology: Some bases operate as microgrids that can disconnect from the larger grid and operate independently if necessary.

These systems don't rely on coal. They work better with diverse power sources and on-site generation. Forcing a military base into a long-term coal power purchase agreement actually complicates resilience strategies.

A base commander's job is to maintain operational readiness. That means having reliable, affordable power. Coal scores poorly on affordability relative to alternatives. And regarding reliability, coal depends on mining operations, transportation infrastructure, and fuel supply chains. Any disruption in those systems affects power availability. Renewables with on-site battery storage eliminate those dependencies.

The Legal and Political Context

This executive order arrives in a specific legal context. The Trump administration has already faced challenges to previous coal-support policies.

The previous attempt involved declaring an "energy emergency" under the Federal Power Act to prevent coal and nuclear plants from retiring. That declaration rested on a tenuous legal interpretation. Energy law scholars broadly questioned whether the Federal Power Act actually granted the authority the administration claimed.

Courtroom battles over that emergency declaration are ongoing. Winning those battles requires proving that an actual grid emergency exists. The data don't support that narrative. The U.S. grid has maintained reliability even as coal capacity declined from 50% of generation in 2005 to roughly 19% today, as noted by EIA's data.

This coal procurement order takes a different legal approach. Instead of claiming emergency authority, it uses standard procurement authority. The Secretary of Defense does have authority to purchase goods and services. The question is whether forcing those purchases violates other laws or constitutional principles.

Meaningfully, forcing the military to overpay for electricity could be challenged as wasteful government spending. It could also face challenges based on environmental laws. If coal procurement increases emissions beyond what strategic requirements dictate, it might trigger environmental review requirements.

But legal battles take years to resolve. In the meantime, the coal industry benefits from uncertainty and the possibility of long-term contracts.

Coal Plant Economics: Why They're Closing

To understand why this order matters, you need to understand why coal plants close in the first place.

Coal plants close because they become uneconomical. Operating a coal power plant requires:

Fuel procurement: Coal must be mined or purchased. Mining operations have limited reserves. As reserves get depleted, extraction costs rise.

Transportation: Coal is heavy. It's transported by rail, which requires infrastructure maintenance. Transportation costs fluctuate based on fuel prices and demand.

Environmental compliance: Modern environmental regulations require pollution control equipment. Retrofitting older plants is expensive.

Labor: Operating a coal plant requires trained staff. Retirements in the coal workforce are accelerating.

Maintenance: Older coal plants require increasingly expensive maintenance as equipment wears out.

When a coal plant operator calculates operating costs and compares them to the electricity price they can sell power for, the math often doesn't work anymore. Natural gas costs less. Renewables cost less. The plant closes.

Forcing the military to sign long-term contracts at above-market rates props up uneconomical plants. It's subsidization by another name. And it's expensive subsidization.

Consider a typical scenario: A coal plant operator wants to keep a 500 MW facility running. Operating costs are

But if the government (via the Department of Defense) signs a contract to buy that power at $75/MWh for 10 years, the plant stays open. The coal industry gets revenue. But taxpayers subsidize every megawatt-hour purchased above the market price.

Over a 10-year contract period for a 500 MW coal plant operating 90% of the time, that's roughly 39 million megawatt-hours. At a

For comparison, that $1.17 billion could purchase:

• Over 1.5 gigawatts of utility-scale solar capacity, providing emissions-free power for 30+ years
• Over 2 gigawatts of wind capacity in high-wind regions
• Distributed battery storage systems across multiple military installations
• Grid modernization and resilience upgrades

The opportunity cost of forcing coal procurement is substantial.

The Renewable Energy Alternative Military Bases Are Already Exploring

While this executive order pushes coal, the military has been quietly moving in a different direction.

The Department of Defense has established renewable energy goals. Many installations have already deployed solar arrays. Some bases have achieved net-zero energy status or are working toward it.

These aren't environmental virtue signals. They're strategic decisions. On-base renewable generation reduces dependence on civilian grid infrastructure. It improves resilience. It reduces operating costs. It provides predictable long-term power pricing.

Joint Base San Antonio, the largest military base in the United States by population, has installed over 35 megawatts of solar capacity across multiple facilities. Camp Lejeune in North Carolina has commissioned a 63-megawatt solar farm. These projects deliver power more cheaply than coal and create genuine energy independence.

If the Department of Defense were genuinely interested in reliable, affordable, on-demand power for mission-critical facilities, renewable energy with battery storage is objectively the better choice. It's cheaper. It's cleaner. It's more resilient.

Forcing coal procurement contradicts the military's own strategic direction and economic interests.

The Long-Term Contract Problem

One detail in the executive order deserves particular attention: long-term Power Purchase Agreements.

A typical coal power purchase agreement locks in pricing and quantity for 10, 15, or even 20 years. During that entire period, the military is obligated to purchase power at the agreed-upon price, regardless of what happens in the broader energy market.

Historically, this has worked against the military's interests. Energy prices change. Technology costs change. A contract signed today might become a terrible deal within five years as market conditions shift.

Consider what happened with natural gas: In 2008, natural gas prices were around

Coal is following a similar trajectory, but downward. The long-term market direction is clear: coal is becoming less economical. Signing long-term coal contracts now means locking in high prices just as the broader market moves toward cheaper alternatives.

From a Department of Defense budgeting perspective, this is backward-looking policy. The military operates with multi-year budget planning. Long-term coal contracts create budget liabilities for decisions made by a different administration, potentially decades earlier.

Grid Integration and Infrastructure Challenges

Integrating coal power purchases into military base operations raises practical infrastructure questions.

Most military bases connect to regional grids owned and operated by utilities. Those utilities have transmission and distribution systems designed based on current generation patterns. Forcing new coal power purchases doesn't necessarily create the infrastructure needed to move that power to the bases.

For example, if a coal plant in Wyoming is forced to sell power to a military base in Virginia, that power still needs to move via transmission lines across multiple states. Transmission capacity might not exist. Building new transmission infrastructure takes years and costs billions.

Utilities aren't obligated to build transmission to accommodate every new generator. The coal plant operator and the military base would need to negotiate transmission arrangements, potentially at additional cost.

Alternatively, forcing bases to purchase power from local coal plants (if they exist) might be geographically impractical. Not every region has viable coal plants. Some military installations are far from coal resources.

Renewable power, by contrast, can be deployed locally. Solar and wind installations built on or near military bases avoid transmission complications entirely.

Historical Context: Why This Order Exists

This order doesn't emerge in a vacuum. It's part of a broader pattern of coal-support policies stretching back to the first Trump administration and continuing through the second.

The coal industry has faced sustained structural decline. U.S. coal production peaked around 2007. Since then, every year has brought additional closures. Renewable energy costs dropped dramatically. Natural gas prices fell. Electricity demand growth slowed. Collectively, these factors made coal economically unviable in most markets.

Policy interventions to support coal have taken various forms: tax credits, subsidies, emergency declarations, and now, forced government procurement. Each approach faces the same fundamental challenge: you cannot make an uneconomical business model economical by simply forcing customers to buy the product.

At some point, the costs of propping up coal exceed any benefit. From a fiscal perspective, the cost of forced coal procurement exceeds what the military would spend on the open market.

From an environmental perspective, choosing coal locks in decades of additional emissions and pollution when cleaner alternatives exist.

From an operational perspective, coal creates vulnerabilities and dependencies that modern military readiness doesn't need.

Yet the order exists because the coal industry has political capital in certain regions and within certain political coalitions. Coal supports jobs in specific communities. Those communities have political weight. Mining companies and coal utilities have influence.

But political influence and economic reality aren't always aligned. No amount of executive orders changes the fact that coal is expensive, polluting, and increasingly unreliable compared to alternatives.

Implementation Challenges and Likely Outcomes

Assuming the order goes into effect, how would it actually work?

The order directs the Secretary of Defense to "seek to procure" coal power. That language is softer than "shall procure." Seek suggests effort, not obligation. The Secretary could argue that they sought to negotiate coal contracts but found them economically impractical.

Still, if the administration interprets the order as mandatory, military procurement offices would need to identify coal plants, evaluate their power offerings, and negotiate contracts.

Several obstacles would emerge immediately:

Limited Available Capacity: Not all coal plants are operational. Many have closed. Those still operating are often already committed to other buyers (utilities, industrial customers). Finding enough available coal capacity to meaningfully power U.S. military installations nationwide is challenging.

High Asking Prices: Coal plant operators know this order creates artificial demand. They'll price accordingly. Expect asking prices significantly above market rates.

Transmission Infrastructure: As noted earlier, physically moving coal-generated electricity to military bases requires transmission infrastructure that may not exist.

Environmental and Legal Challenges: As this order faces court challenges on environmental grounds or constitutional grounds, procurement offices would face uncertainty about whether contracts they're negotiating will actually be legal.

Congressional Budget Battles: Congress controls the military's budget. If forced coal procurement dramatically increases electricity costs, Congress would need to approve supplemental funding or authorize cost transfers from other military programs.

Most likely scenario: The order becomes a negotiating tool. The administration announces intentions. Coal companies submit proposals. Some contracts are signed. But the scale falls far short of what the order suggests because economic and practical realities constrain implementation.

Worst-case scenario: The order is fully implemented. The military signs large, expensive coal contracts. Courts eventually strike them down. The contracts are broken, potentially triggering litigation from coal companies claiming damages. The entire effort ends up costing billions in wasted spending and legal fees.

Comparison to Alternative Energy Security Strategies

If the underlying goal is to ensure the military has reliable, affordable power, the strategy should focus on diverse generation, on-site resilience, and market-competitive procurement.

That would mean:

Accelerating Renewable Deployment at Military Bases: Solar and wind installations paired with battery storage provide firm, on-demand power without the cost or emissions of coal.

Investing in Transmission Infrastructure: Modern transmission networks enable flexibility and resilience. Microgrids at military bases can disconnect from broader grids during emergencies and operate independently.

Negotiating Market-Competitive Power Purchase Agreements: The military should procure power at market rates from the most economical sources available. That's how you get reliable power at the lowest cost.

Supporting Energy Efficiency: Reducing energy demand through efficiency improvements is the cheapest generation. An LED lighting retrofit program across all military buildings would reduce electricity consumption by billions of kilowatt-hours annually.

Developing Grid Security Capabilities: Hardening military installations against cyberattacks on power systems and physical threats to transmission infrastructure is genuinely necessary.

None of these strategies rely on coal. All of them would deliver better operational outcomes than forced coal procurement.

The gap between what this order proposes and what strategic military energy needs actually require is enormous.

Economic Modeling: The Real Cost of Forced Coal Procurement

Let's model the likely economic impact in concrete terms.

The Department of Defense consumes approximately 30 terawatt-hours of electricity annually. That's roughly 3% of U.S. electricity consumption. Not all of that would be subject to coal procurement (some comes from on-site generation, some is already locked into existing contracts), but let's estimate 10 terawatt-hours might potentially be affected.

At current market prices, that's roughly

If the military is forced into coal contracts at

Over a 10-year contract period, that's $3 billion in additional costs.

Alternatively, if the military deployed solar and wind resources (with battery storage for overnight and cloudy periods) to supply that same 10 TWh, the levelized cost would likely be $50-60/MWh (accounting for storage). That's lower than market rates and massively cheaper than coal.

The 10-year cost of renewable procurement: roughly $2.5-3 billion in power costs plus initial capital investment. But capital costs would be depreciated and tax-advantaged, and the systems would be owned by the military, creating assets rather than consuming money on power contracts.

Forced coal procurement: $7.5 billion in power costs over 10 years, with no asset ownership and increasing emissions liability.

The mathematics are clear. Coal is the expensive option.

Policy Precedent and Administrative Law Concerns

This order also raises broader questions about the proper scope of presidential authority.

The executive order uses procurement authority. Presidents do have authority to direct federal agencies to purchase goods and services. But that authority isn't unlimited. Courts have historically enforced constraints on executive spending authority, particularly when:

The spending is wasteful: Knowingly paying above-market rates for goods and services can be challenged as waste of government funds.

The spending violates statutory obligations: Environmental laws, for example, might require environmental review before entering long-term contracts.

The spending conflicts with other statutes: Budget laws, procurement regulations, and energy laws might constrain the authority to force coal purchases.

If this order is fully litigated, courts would need to balance presidential procurement authority against these constraints. The outcome is uncertain, but the legal foundation is weaker than it appears at first glance.

Moreover, Congress could simply defund this mandate through appropriations law. The House or Senate could prohibit using defense appropriations for coal power procurement. That would effectively nullify the order regardless of its legal merits.

The Broader Energy Context

This order exists against a backdrop of rapid energy transformation.

U.S. electricity generation is transitioning away from fossil fuels and toward renewables. That transition accelerated significantly during Trump's first term, despite administration opposition. Wind and solar installed capacity grew. Battery storage deployment accelerated. Coal's share of generation continued declining.

Market forces are driving this transition. Coal can't compete with renewables on cost. Natural gas can, but only barely in some regions. The economics favor continued movement away from coal.

Forcing government procurement against this broader market trend doesn't change the underlying economics. It just creates inefficiencies and wastes money.

Meanwhile, other nations are watching. Countries that invest aggressively in renewable energy and battery technology will dominate 21st-century energy markets. The U.S. has advantages in both technologies. Choosing to force coal procurement sends a signal that the U.S. is moving backward in energy competitiveness.

What Happens When This Order Ends

Assuming the executive order is implemented and long-term coal contracts are signed, what happens after Trump's term ends in January 2029?

If a subsequent administration wants to terminate coal contracts, they face several obstacles:

Contractual Obligations: Long-term contracts are binding. Breaking them early triggers termination fees and potentially litigation.

Political Opposition: Coal companies and coal-supporting interests would fight termination.

Sunk Costs: The longer contracts run, the more "sunk" costs accumulate, making termination more expensive.

This is precisely why long-term coal contracts matter strategically. They outlast the administration that signed them. They commit future administrations to policies they didn't choose.

For a military trying to optimize energy spending over decades, this creates instability. Budget predictability is important. Being locked into expensive coal contracts by a previous administration reduces flexibility for future energy strategies.

Alternatively, if a subsequent administration keeps the coal contracts but no longer actively renews them, they wind down naturally over 10-15 years. But that's 10-15 years of expensive power consumption that could have been cheaper.

Military Voice and Resistance

One aspect rarely discussed: what does the military actually want?

Military leadership isn't focused on coal policy. They're focused on operational readiness. If forced coal procurement creates inefficiencies, wastes money, or complicates their missions, they'll quietly resist.

Historically, military leadership has supported renewable energy deployment because it improves base resilience and reduces operational costs. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam's renewable deployment, for example, was driven by Pacific Command's desire to reduce vulnerability to fuel supply disruptions.

Forcing coal procurement contradicts military leadership's stated priorities. There's likely to be quiet bureaucratic resistance. Procurement officers will find reasons why contracts are difficult to finalize. Base commanders will explain why their facilities can't accommodate coal power. Budget officials will raise costs concerns.

This resistance is often invisible to the public, but it can substantially limit how effectively an order actually gets implemented.

FAQ

Why would Trump push for coal contracts when coal is more expensive than other options?

Coal has political significance in certain regions and within certain political coalitions. Western states like Wyoming, Montana, and Colorado have coal mining operations and coal-dependent communities. Supporting coal appeals to that political base. Additionally, some ideological opposition exists to renewable energy policies, creating political motivation to support traditional fossil fuels. But the decision is primarily political, not economic.

Can the military legally be forced to buy coal power?

That's an unsettled legal question. The executive order uses procurement authority that presidents have. However, courts might find that forcing above-market purchases violates federal spending laws or that environmental requirements weren't properly satisfied. The order would likely face legal challenges, with uncertain outcomes. Any judge would need to balance presidential procurement authority against constraints from budget law and environmental regulations.

What's the actual reliability difference between coal and renewable energy with battery storage?

Coal plants can run continuously for long periods but have forced outage rates of 2-6% at any given time. Battery storage systems can provide on-demand power within milliseconds, with availability rates above 95% when properly maintained. For mission-critical military applications, battery-backed renewable systems are actually more reliable because they can respond instantly and don't require fuel supply chains. The "baseload" argument for coal is increasingly outdated with modern battery technology.

How much would forced coal procurement actually cost taxpayers?

If the military is forced into coal contracts at

Are military bases already using renewable energy?

Yes, extensively. Joint Base San Antonio has 35+ megawatts of solar installed. Camp Lejeune has a 63-megawatt solar farm. Nellis Air Force Base has one of the largest on-base solar installations in the nation. Military leadership has supported renewable deployment because it improves base resilience and reduces operating costs. Forcing coal procurement contradicts the direction military leadership has been moving.

What happens if Congress doesn't fund this program?

Congress controls the Department of Defense's budget. If forced coal procurement would require additional appropriations beyond current budgets, Congress would need to approve supplemental funding. A Congress opposed to the mandate could simply refuse to appropriate money for it, effectively killing the program. This gives Congress a veto point if the order goes forward.

How does forced coal procurement affect climate commitments?

It increases them substantially. Coal produces roughly 820 grams of CO2 per kilowatt-hour compared to near-zero for renewables. Locking in 10 years of coal procurement creates billions of tons of additional CO2 emissions compared to renewable alternatives. This contradicts U.S. climate commitments and military recognition of climate change as a strategic threat.

What would be a better energy strategy for military bases?

A better strategy would include accelerated renewable deployment with on-site battery storage, microgrid development to improve resilience, transmission infrastructure improvements, energy efficiency upgrades, and market-competitive power procurement. That combination would deliver reliable, affordable power while reducing emissions and improving strategic resilience. It's what military leadership has been advocating for and what economics supports.

This executive order represents a collision between political intention and economic reality. Trump wants to support coal. The military needs reliable, affordable electricity. Those goals align poorly.

Forcing coal procurement would waste billions of taxpayer dollars, increase emissions, create grid vulnerabilities, and contradict military leadership's own strategic energy direction. It would lock the military into expensive contracts based on political ideology rather than operational needs.

If the administration actually wanted to ensure military energy security, the strategy would look completely different. It would embrace the exact technologies and approaches military leadership has been pursuing: renewables, on-site generation, battery storage, and market-competitive procurement.

That's not ideology. That's evidence-based strategy.

But political pressure from coal interests apparently trumps operational reality. And the Department of Defense—along with taxpayers—will bear the cost.