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Why Minnesota Can't Stop ICE: The Federal Authority Problem Explained
When thousands of federal immigration agents descend on a state, local politicians face an uncomfortable reality: they're largely powerless to stop them. This isn't a failure of leadership or political will. It's baked into America's constitutional structure. Minnesota's struggle with federal immigration enforcement in recent years exposes a fundamental tension in American federalism that most people don't fully understand.
Imagine being a governor or mayor watching federal agents operate in your jurisdiction without your approval, making decisions that affect your constituents, and you can't simply order them to leave. The frustration is real. But the legal and constitutional barriers preventing state intervention are equally real, rooted in 230 years of American constitutional development.
What makes this situation especially complex is that it involves competing claims of legitimate authority. The federal government has constitutional power over immigration. States have sovereign authority within their borders. When these powers collide, the Constitution doesn't provide a clear roadmap for conflict resolution. Instead, it relies on a fragile balance that assumes good faith cooperation between federal and state authorities.
The Trump administration's approach to immigration enforcement, particularly aggressive deployments in Democratic-led cities, has exposed cracks in this delicate system. Minnesota officials have found themselves searching desperately for legal and constitutional tools to protect their residents. What they've discovered is that most of the tools they hoped to use either don't exist, carry enormous practical risks, or are explicitly blocked by federal law.
This article explores why Minnesota and other states face such limited options, examining the constitutional foundations of federal authority, the specific legal barriers preventing state resistance, and the political calculations that keep elected officials from escalating confrontations with federal law enforcement.
TL; DR
- Federal authority over immigration is nearly absolute: The Constitution grants Congress broad power to regulate immigration, and courts have historically upheld federal immigration enforcement against state challenges, as noted in Vera Institute's analysis.
- State sovereignty doesn't extend to federal operations: States cannot legally prevent federal agents from operating within their borders, even when local officials object, according to California's Know Your Rights guide.
- Federalism assumes federal restraint: The constitutional structure depends on federal officials acting with reasonableness and respect for local governance, assumptions that break down under aggressive federal policies, as discussed in CNN's coverage of ICE operations.
- Courts offer limited relief: While states can sue to block immigration policies, litigation is slow, and injunctions are temporary band-aids, not permanent solutions, as highlighted by PBS's legal expert analysis.
- The Insurrection Act threat looms large: Presidents can use the Insurrection Act to deploy federal troops, making aggressive state resistance potentially catastrophic for civilians, as detailed in Time's report on federal authority.
Understanding Federalism: Why States Can't Simply Boot Out Federal Agents
America's federal system divides power between national and state governments. This division looks elegant on paper. In practice, it creates endless disputes about where one government's authority ends and another's begins.
The Constitution is explicit on one point: federal law is the supreme law of the land. When federal and state law conflict, federal law wins. This supremacy clause has been interpreted broadly by courts for over two centuries. It means states can't nullify federal laws, can't prevent federal agents from operating within their borders, and can't use state law to obstruct federal enforcement.
But here's the critical part that most people misunderstand: this doesn't mean states are powerless. Federalism isn't a one-way street. States retain what's called "reserved powers" under the Tenth Amendment. These include police powers, criminal jurisdiction, control over state agencies, and the ability to set policy that doesn't directly conflict with federal law.
The problem is that immigration enforcement lives in a gray zone. It's clearly federal jurisdiction, but it affects public safety and community relations in ways that are traditionally state and local concerns. When federal agents operate in Minnesota, they're dealing with potential crimes, detainees, and public safety situations. Local police have their own jurisdiction and responsibilities. But local police can't prevent federal agents from operating. They can investigate federal agents' conduct, but they can't arrest them for executing federal law.
This creates situations where local and federal law enforcement are at cross-purposes. Minneapolis police condemn federal shootings. They investigate federal agents' conduct. They refuse to cooperate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement operations. But they can't stop ICE from operating, as explained in ACLU's analysis of federal authority.
The legal principle here is that a state can't commandeer federal authority or interfere with federal functions. This was established in cases like Printz v. United States, where the Supreme Court ruled that states can't be forced to help enforce federal law, but they also can't actively obstruct federal law enforcement.
What this means in practice: Minnesota can't pass a law saying federal immigration agents need state permission to operate. It can't require them to follow state procedures. It can't limit their authority based on state law. Those attempts would directly conflict with federal authority and would likely be struck down in court.
The federal government's authority over immigration comes from the Constitution's Immigration and Naturalization Clause, which gives Congress power over naturalization. Courts have interpreted this incredibly broadly. As long as immigration agents are acting within their federal authority, states have limited ability to constrain them through law.
But this constitutional reality creates a dependency relationship that assumes federal restraint. The entire system works only if federal officials exercise their power reasonably and with respect for state sovereignty in areas where states do have clear authority, like local policing and public safety.
The Constitutional Constraints: Why Court Challenges Are the Primary Tool
When Minnesota sued to block immigration enforcement operations, they weren't choosing the legal strategy they preferred. They were choosing from an extremely limited menu of options. Court challenges are the primary tool available because almost everything else is blocked.
The Tenth Amendment argument seems promising at first. If states have reserved powers, why can't they use those to prevent federal operations that disrupt public safety? The answer lies in how courts interpret the Supremacy Clause. States can't use their police powers to obstruct federal enforcement, even if that federal enforcement causes local problems.
Courts have established that states can challenge federal actions on specific grounds. They can argue that a federal policy violates the Constitution. They can claim that a federal agency exceeded its statutory authority. They can sue if federal action violates their sovereign interests. But they can't simply object to federal presence or operations.
Minnesota's lawsuit attempted to argue that federal immigration enforcement operations violated the Fourth Amendment by engaging in pretextual stops and discriminatory targeting. This is a legitimate constitutional argument. Immigration agents can't stop people solely based on their appearance or accent, even though they have more authority than regular police to stop and question people based on immigration status.
The challenge is that Fourth Amendment violations are individual claims, typically raised by people who've been stopped or arrested. Arguing them at a state level requires showing a pattern of violations affecting the state's interests. Courts are skeptical of these claims because they're uncomfortable with broad pronouncements about federal law enforcement practices.
Another approach Minnesota pursued was arguing that federal immigration enforcement violated state sovereignty in specific ways. For example, Minnesota could argue that federal agents interfering with state police conducting their duties violates state sovereignty. This is a more abstract argument, and courts have been reluctant to accept it in the immigration context.
The real constraint on state authority comes from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which established that immigration is federal jurisdiction. Every major immigration law since then has reinforced this principle. States can regulate state-level issues related to immigrants, like employment or housing. They can't regulate who gets to be in the country or how federal immigration agents operate.
What's particularly frustrating for state officials is that court remedies are slow. A temporary restraining order takes days and applies only to specific circumstances. An injunction can take weeks or months. By the time a court rules, the immediate crisis has passed. Federal agents have already conducted operations, people have already been detained, and the situation has evolved.
Federal judges are also reluctant to second-guess federal law enforcement's operational decisions. They'll intervene if there's a clear constitutional violation, but they're hesitant to manage day-to-day federal enforcement operations. This gives federal immigration officials considerable room to operate even while litigation proceeds, as noted in Michigan Advance's report on federal lawsuits.
The National Guard Option: Why Mobilization Isn't a Solution
Governors control the National Guard, which operates under their authority when not federally activated. This sounds like a powerful tool against federal overreach. The reality is much more complicated and potentially dangerous.
When Governor Tim Walz activated the Minnesota National Guard in response to federal immigration enforcement operations, many people wondered why he wasn't deploying them to physically confront federal agents. The answer reveals a crucial limit on gubernatorial power.
The National Guard can be deployed for state emergencies under state law. But once federal officials invoke federal statutes, the situation changes dramatically. The federal government can federalize the National Guard, removing it from state control and putting it under federal command. This happens through the process of federalization, which has been used multiple times historically.
More importantly, the Insurrection Act gives the president extraordinary power to deploy federal troops if a state refuses to suppress an "insurrection." If a governor deployed the National Guard against federal agents, the president could potentially declare an insurrection and deploy active-duty military to override the governor's authority. This would be constitutionally questionable, but it's the legal tool the Trump administration explicitly considered using, as detailed in ACLU's explanation of the Insurrection Act.
In 2024 and early 2025, federal officials repeatedly suggested that Minnesota officials were in "insurrection" or close to it. Trump announced criminal investigations into Governor Walz and Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey, creating the pretense of legitimate federal action. This threat was real enough that Walz and other officials had to consider it seriously.
The National Guard's actual role became one of supporting local law enforcement and protecting civilians, not confronting federal agents. This is still significant work. The Guard can control crowds, prevent escalation, and provide a visible sign that the state is taking the situation seriously. But it's not a confrontation with federal authority.
The reason this distinction matters is constitutional. States can't use military force against the federal government. The Civil War settled that question. Any attempt by a state to use the National Guard to prevent federal officials from operating would be met with federal military force. The outcome would be catastrophic for the state and its residents.
This creates an impossible position for governors. They want to protect their residents from federal overreach. They control the National Guard. But using it to directly oppose federal authority triggers the Insurrection Act and potentially brings federal military force into the state. It's a confrontation a state cannot win.
So the National Guard becomes a buffer, not a weapon. It protects state residents and ensures state law enforcement can do its job, but it doesn't directly oppose federal enforcement. This limitation isn't about weakness or lack of political will. It's about the fundamental imbalance of military power between states and the federal government.
Historically, the only time states have directly opposed federal military authority, it ended in violence. The National Guard mobilizations during civil rights enforcement in the 1960s, when governors tried to prevent federal officials from enforcing integration orders, showed how quickly these situations escalate. Federal marshals and troops deployed, tensions exploded, and state National Guard often ended up cooperating with federal forces anyway.
State Criminal Law: Why Prosecuting Federal Agents Is Complicated
Minnesota has a parallel criminal investigation into federal immigration agents involved in shootings. This seems straightforward. Federal agents shot people. Under Minnesota criminal law, shooting someone is potentially murder or manslaughter. Shouldn't state prosecutors be able to charge them?
The answer is yes, technically. But practically, it's far more complicated. States can prosecute federal officials for crimes committed within their jurisdiction, including crimes committed while performing federal duties. But there are significant obstacles.
First, federal officials often have qualified immunity, a legal doctrine that protects government officials from civil liability unless they violated "clearly established" constitutional rights. Criminal liability is different from civil liability, but the same assumption of official immunity runs through both doctrines. Courts are reluctant to expose federal officials to personal criminal prosecution for actions taken in their official capacity, even if those actions seem criminal.
Second, if a federal official claims they were acting under federal authority or following federal orders, the case becomes a question about federal authority, not state criminal law. Federal courts might intervene and prevent state prosecution of federal officials acting in their federal capacity. The doctrine of federal question removal allows federal courts to take over cases involving federal officials and federal authority.
Third, there's the practical problem of enforcement. If a state prosecutor charges a federal agent with murder and the federal government refuses to cooperate, how does the state extradite the agent? The federal government can shield its officials from state prosecution by maintaining that they were acting under federal authority.
Minnesota's investigations into federal shootings are partially symbolic. They show that the state doesn't accept the federal government's characterization of events. They potentially create political pressure. But they're unlikely to result in convictions, especially if federal authorities decide to defend their agents aggressively, as noted in State Court Report's analysis.
The Constitution doesn't explicitly address whether states can prosecute federal officials, but the historical assumption has been that they can. However, federal courts have developed doctrines that protect federal officials from state prosecution when the federal government asserts that the official was acting under federal authority.
State prosecutors can charge federal agents with state crimes, but federal courts can ultimately decide whether those charges stick or whether federal authority shields the agents from prosecution. This puts state prosecutors in an awkward position. They can demonstrate state authority by pursuing charges, but they're unlikely to succeed if federal authorities decide to defend their agents.
The Immigration Authority Problem: Federal Control Over Who's in the Country
The core issue underneath all of this is that immigration is exclusively federal jurisdiction. The Constitution gives Congress power over naturalization and immigration. No state has power to decide who can be in the country, regardless of their immigration status.
This wasn't always true. Historically, states had more control over who could enter and stay. But that changed with early immigration laws that established federal dominance. Today, every major immigration decision is federal. The federal government decides who qualifies for different visa categories. The federal government determines who can be deported. The federal government establishes enforcement priorities.
States can regulate state-level issues related to immigrants. They can decide whether immigrants can get driver's licenses. They can set policies about state benefits. They can regulate employment within their borders. But they can't override federal immigration decisions or prevent federal enforcement.
Minnesota's attempts to limit ICE cooperation with state police or to establish immigration sanctuaries face this fundamental constraint. Even if Minnesota law says state police won't help federal agents, Minnesota can't legally prevent federal agents from operating. Federal agents have federal authority to enter the state and conduct immigration enforcement, regardless of state law.
Some states have tried to create "sanctuary" policies where state resources don't cooperate with federal immigration enforcement. This is legal because states aren't obligated to help enforce federal law. But it doesn't prevent federal enforcement. It just means federal agents operate with fewer resources from state cooperation.
The immigration authority problem creates a hierarchy where federal power is essentially unreviewable. State officials can complain, investigate, sue on constitutional grounds, or refuse to cooperate. But they can't prevent federal immigration enforcement. That power is entirely federal.
This becomes especially problematic when federal officials abuse that power. If a federal immigration agent acts discriminatorily or violates constitutional rights, the individual can sue. But there's no state-level mechanism to broadly constrain federal immigration enforcement practices. States have to fight each abuse individually through courts, and courts are reluctant to restrict federal immigration authority, as highlighted in ICE's 287(g) program documentation.
The Sovereignty Argument: Why States Can't Win by Claiming Sovereign Immunity
One argument states have attempted is sovereign immunity. The idea sounds promising: states are sovereign, federal government can't violate that sovereignty without state consent, therefore federal immigration operations need state approval.
This argument fails because the Constitution explicitly limits state sovereignty in specific areas. Immigration is one of those areas. The Constitution says states can't regulate commerce, coin money, make treaties, or regulate immigration without federal approval. These are federal powers, and states are explicitly prohibited from exercising them.
Courts have been consistent on this point across two centuries of litigation. State sovereignty doesn't include the power to control immigration. Federal immigration authority is constitutionally supreme in this domain.
States have occasionally tried to argue that federal immigration enforcement violates their sovereignty in ways that deserve protection. For example, Minnesota might argue that federal agents interfering with state police operations violates the state's sovereign interest in providing public safety. This is a more creative argument, but courts have been skeptical of it.
The reason courts reject this argument is that the federal government has legitimate federal interests that outweigh state sovereignty claims. Federal immigration enforcement serves federal interests in controlling borders and managing the immigration system. These federal interests are constitutionally valid and override state sovereignty claims in the immigration context.
What this means practically is that states can't use sovereignty arguments to prevent federal immigration operations. They're stuck with more limited tools like constitutional litigation, refusing cooperation, and National Guard deployment for state-side purposes.
The Cooperation Problem: Tensions Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement
Even though states can't prevent federal immigration enforcement, there's significant potential for conflict between federal agents and state and local law enforcement. This conflict has escalated dramatically in recent years.
Minnesota police departments have been explicit that they don't cooperate with ICE. This is a state and local policy decision that's legal. States can tell their police not to help federal immigration enforcement. This doesn't prevent federal enforcement, but it means federal agents operate without state police assistance.
The conflict goes deeper. Local police are supposed to maintain relationships with the communities they serve. Community trust is essential for policing. When federal agents operate in a jurisdiction, targeting immigrants based on appearance or accent, community trust in all police erodes. Local police suffer the consequences.
Cross-agency tensions have also emerged. Federal immigration agents harassing off-duty police officers created friction. Federal agents trying to prevent local police from investigating federal shooting incidents created confrontation. These tensions don't change federal authority, but they make coordination impossible and increase the risk of escalation.
The problem is that there's no mechanism for resolving these operational conflicts. Federal agents have authority to operate. Local police have authority to investigate crimes. When federal agents and local police disagree about what constitutes appropriate conduct, there's no higher authority to referee except federal courts, which are slow and reluctant to intervene in law enforcement operations.
This conflict is especially acute in jurisdiction-sharing situations. If federal agents shoot someone, local police have authority to investigate homicide. But the shooting involves a federal official, which complicates state jurisdiction. Federal prosecutors can claim federal question jurisdiction. They can argue that the shooting was in furtherance of federal duties. They can resist state investigation through various legal tools.
The coordination failure between federal and local law enforcement in Minnesota reflected deep disagreements about the appropriateness of federal operations, the standards for use of force, and the relative importance of federal immigration enforcement versus local public safety, as reported by NBC News.
Constitutional Checks on Executive Power: Are There Any?
This situation raises a fundamental constitutional question: are there any checks on federal executive power when implementing federal immigration enforcement? The answer is complicated.
The Constitution gives Congress power over immigration, not the president. The president executes the laws that Congress passes. If the president acts beyond congressional authorization, that's potentially unconstitutional. But immigration law gives the executive enormous discretion.
For example, Congress established the immigration system and gave the executive authority to enforce it. But Congress didn't establish detailed rules about how agents should conduct stops, searches, or interviews. This leaves the executive wide discretion to set enforcement priorities and procedures.
Congress could impose constraints on immigration enforcement. It could require warrants for all immigration-related stops. It could prohibit discriminatory enforcement. It could limit the federal immigration agency's budget or authority. But Congress is a co-equal branch that's supposed to check the executive. When Congress is controlled by the party supporting the executive, these checks don't function.
Courts can constrain executive immigration enforcement through constitutional interpretation. But courts are institutionally reluctant to second-guess law enforcement decisions, especially in immigration matters. Immigration law is an area where courts have historically deferred heavily to the executive.
Individual people can challenge immigration enforcement as violating their constitutional rights. This is the primary judicial check on immigration enforcement. But it's slow, requires individual cases, and depends on sympathetic judges.
The Constitution has very few direct checks on federal immigration enforcement. It has structural checks, like separation of powers and Congress's power of the purse. But these only work if the political branches are willing to use them.
What's particularly concerning about the recent federal immigration operations in Minnesota is that they went beyond what Congress explicitly authorized. Congress didn't authorize the scale of federal immigration enforcement that was deployed. This raises questions about whether the executive exceeded its authority.
But challenging this requires either congressional action or litigation, both of which are slow. Meanwhile, federal operations continued, affecting thousands of people, as highlighted in CFR's report on federal authority.
The Political Dimension: Why Federal Officials Ignore State Objections
Minnesota's governor and mayor repeatedly asked the federal government to reduce or withdraw federal immigration enforcement operations. These requests were ignored or rejected. Why would federal officials ignore elected state officials?
The answer lies in the political incentives facing federal officials. Immigration has become a central political issue. Conservative politicians have made aggressive immigration enforcement a key policy position. Federal officials implementing this policy face political pressure to show results, demonstrate commitment to enforcement, and visibly confront sanctuary cities.
Minnesota is controlled by Democrats who oppose Trump administration immigration policies. From the federal administration's perspective, Minnesota's objections are politically motivated. Federal officials have no incentive to defer to state wishes when the state is politically opposed to their policies.
This creates a perverse political incentive structure. The federal officials conducting immigration enforcement are accountable to the president and the federal government, not to state and local officials. If state officials object, federal officials can simply ignore them, secure in the knowledge that federal authority is constitutionally supreme in immigration matters.
Congress could establish a mechanism requiring federal immigration enforcement to be coordinated with state and local wishes. But Congress hasn't done this, and the current Congress is unlikely to do it given the political alignment favoring aggressive immigration enforcement.
The political dynamic also affects other branches. Federal prosecutors are appointed by the president and are answerable to the federal government, not state officials. If a state prosecutor wants to investigate federal agents, the federal prosecutor can provide a contrary legal interpretation. Federal courts are staffed with judges appointed by federal officials who may be sympathetic to federal agencies' positions.
This political dimension is crucial because it shows that the constitutional problem has a political solution. The Constitution doesn't mandate aggressive immigration enforcement that ignores state wishes. Federal officials could choose to coordinate with state governments, respect their concerns, and moderate enforcement approaches. They simply choose not to.
But from a constitutional perspective, they have the right to make this choice. The Constitution gives the federal government immigration authority and doesn't require federal officials to defer to state wishes unless there's a clear constitutional violation.
The Federalism Paradox: System Design Assumes Good Faith
America's federal system contains a profound paradox. It divides power between federal and state governments, but it doesn't clearly resolve conflicts between them. The system assumes that federal and state officials will generally cooperate and act in good faith.
This assumption breaks down when one level of government is determined to exercise its power in ways the other level considers harmful. When the federal government deploys massive enforcement operations in a state against that state's wishes, and the state has no constitutional remedy, the system reveals its fragility.
The Constitution doesn't give states the right to override federal law or prevent federal operations. But it also doesn't give the federal government the right to ignore state interests or trample on state sovereignty. The balance depends on federal officials restraint and state and federal cooperation.
When federal officials act aggressively and state officials have no legal remedy, the system's foundation is exposed. The state can sue, but slowly. The state can refuse cooperation, but that doesn't stop federal enforcement. The state can activate the National Guard, but for state purposes, not federal opposition. The state can conduct criminal investigations, but federal officials are shielded by immunity doctrines.
This imbalance led to the Civil War once before. Federal power became unacceptable to states, states attempted to secede, and the resulting conflict killed 600,000 people. The Constitution was amended after the war to clarify federal supremacy. But it still doesn't resolve how to handle situations where federal power is exercised in ways states consider illegitimate.
The Reconstruction Amendments attempted to address this by limiting state power in specific areas, particularly around civil rights. But they still depend on federal willingness to enforce the limits. When federal officials themselves abuse power, the Constitution's checks become theoretical rather than practical.
The International Comparison: Do Other Federations Have Better Solutions?
America isn't the only federal system in the world. Canada, Australia, and Germany all have federal systems with similar divisions of power. Do they have better solutions to the problem of federal-state conflict?
Canada's federal system explicitly lists federal powers, including immigration. But Canada also has mechanisms for federal-provincial coordination. Provincial governments participate in immigration policy discussions. Federal immigration enforcement is coordinated with provincial police. There's an expectation of consultation and cooperation.
Australia has immigration as a federal power, but state governments have significant control over policing and criminal justice. Conflicts between federal and state authorities in Australia go to federal court for resolution. Australia also has a federal commission that investigates police misconduct across both federal and state agencies.
Germany's federal system (or "Federalism") gives immigration control to the federal government but requires cooperation with state governments. German states have police powers and can investigate federal agency conduct. There are established mechanisms for federal-state conflict resolution.
What's notable about these systems is that they combine federal immigration authority with explicit mechanisms for federal-state coordination and conflict resolution. They assume there will be tensions but try to manage them through institutional design.
America's system is more adversarial. It gives federal power but fewer mechanisms for coordination. It relies more on courts to resolve conflicts. It assumes less institutionalized cooperation.
This difference reflects America's historical experiences. The United States was founded with skepticism of federal power. States fought to retain authority. The Constitution was designed to limit federal power. But it didn't anticipate how much power federal immigration authority would eventually wield.
Other federations designed their systems later, with the benefit of seeing how American federalism actually works. They built in more coordination mechanisms and less reliance on adversarial court resolution.
For America, copying these international approaches would require constitutional amendment or major federal legislation reorganizing immigration enforcement. Neither seems likely in the current political environment.
Legislative Solutions: What Congress Could Do
Congress has the power to constrain federal immigration enforcement in ways the Constitution doesn't automatically require. Here are some legislative options Congress could pursue.
Congress could require warrants for all immigration enforcement stops. This would eliminate the authority that immigration agents have to stop people based on reasonable suspicion of immigration status. It would align immigration enforcement with regular Fourth Amendment standards.
Congress could establish an oversight board for immigration enforcement, including state and local representation. This would create an institutional mechanism for coordinating federal enforcement with local concerns.
Congress could require federal immigration enforcement to be coordinated with local law enforcement. This would prevent federal agents from operating completely independently in jurisdictions where local police don't cooperate.
Congress could eliminate qualified immunity for federal immigration agents in cases involving discriminatory enforcement or constitutional violations. This would make federal agents personally liable for misconduct.
Congress could impose explicit standards on immigration enforcement, including prohibitions on discriminatory stops, requirements for interpreters, and standards for interviewing suspects.
Congress could limit the federal immigration agency's budget or authority. It could require congressional approval for large-scale enforcement operations. It could redirect funding toward less aggressive enforcement approaches.
Congress could establish a federal enforcement review board that investigates misconduct by federal agents and can recommend discipline or termination.
The problem is that all of these solutions require Congress to act. And Congress is unlikely to constrain federal immigration enforcement when the current majority supports aggressive enforcement.
But this points to an important constitutional principle: the Constitution gives Congress the power to constrain executive immigration enforcement, but only if Congress is willing to exercise that power. When Congress doesn't act, the executive has wide discretion.
This is why the political dimension is so important. Constitutional change often comes through political change, not judicial decision. If the political party supporting aggressive immigration enforcement loses power, its successor could substantially reorganize immigration enforcement through legislation.
The Individual Rights Approach: Protecting People vs. Constraining Authority
Since states can't prevent federal immigration enforcement, the primary legal approach has been protecting individual rights through litigation. People who are stopped by federal immigration agents can challenge whether their rights were violated.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Immigration agents can stop people based on reasonable suspicion of immigration violation, a lower standard than regular police need for stops. But even immigration agents can't conduct searches or seizures in ways that are unconstitutional.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause protects against discriminatory enforcement. Even if the law itself is constitutional, applying it in a discriminatory way can violate equal protection.
The Fifth Amendment protects against due process violations. If federal immigration agents violate due process in detaining or questioning someone, that's actionable.
The problem with this approach is that it works one case at a time. Each person who's stopped has to challenge their individual stop or detention. Courts have to be convinced that a constitutional violation occurred. There's no mechanism for making systemic changes to federal enforcement practices except through establishing a consistent pattern of courts finding violations.
States have attempted to bring class action litigation to establish that federal enforcement practices are systematically unconstitutional. These cases are slow and difficult. Federal courts don't want to manage immigration enforcement operations. They prefer individual cases where a clear violation is obvious.
The individual rights approach has also been constrained by doctrines like qualified immunity, which protect government officials from liability unless they violated "clearly established" rights. Since immigration law is complex and enforcement standards are evolving, what's clearly established often depends on prior cases. This creates a catch-22 where earlier abuses can continue because the right being violated wasn't clearly established.
What's required for systemic change through individual rights litigation is sustained legal action over years or decades, favorable judges, and a critical mass of findings that establish a pattern. This is slow and uncertain.
The Democratic Accountability Problem: Why Elections Don't Help
One might expect that if federal immigration enforcement is unpopular in a state, voters would elect federal officials who oppose it. But this doesn't happen automatically because immigration enforcement is just one issue among many, and federal elections are determined by national politics, not state-level concerns.
Minnesota is a Democratic-leaning state, but its congressional delegation has limited power over immigration enforcement. Federal immigration agencies are executive agencies, answerable to the president. Congress appropriates money, but immigration enforcement spending is embedded in larger appropriations bills. Individual members of Congress can't easily redirect immigration enforcement priorities through the legislative process.
The president is elected nationally, not by individual states. A president who campaigns on aggressive immigration enforcement will implement it regardless of how individual states vote. As long as the president has political support nationally, federal immigration enforcement continues despite local opposition.
This creates a democratic accountability problem. The people of Minnesota can vote for federal candidates who oppose the immigration enforcement they don't like. But if the national electorate supports the president, Minnesota voters are overridden by national political forces.
Historically, this tension has been resolved through federalism's assumption of restraint. Even when a president has authority to do something, restraint and respect for state concerns prevent exercise of that authority. But when restraint disappears, democratic mechanisms at the state level become irrelevant.
Congress could resolve this by either constraining immigration enforcement authority or by establishing mechanisms for federal-state coordination. But Congress is often controlled by the same political party as the president, so these checks don't function.
What this reveals is that American federalism assumes that democratic processes will generally produce alignment between federal and state political leadership, or at least that federal leadership will respect state concerns even when they disagree politically. When these assumptions fail, the system has limited mechanisms for resolving the conflict.
Looking Forward: What Changes Could Address This Problem
The current situation raises the question of what could be changed to address the problem. Several approaches are possible, though each has significant obstacles.
Constitutional amendment is theoretically possible but practically difficult. Amending the Constitution requires overwhelming political consensus. Changing the federal immigration authority would require even broader agreement, since both parties generally support federal immigration authority. Amendments would be rare.
Legislative reform is more realistic. Congress could establish new mechanisms for federal-state coordination, impose standards on federal immigration enforcement, or require consultation with state and local officials. This would require political change, since current Congress supports aggressive enforcement. But if political alignment changes, legislation becomes possible.
Institutional reform within the executive branch is also possible. The president could establish policies requiring federal immigration agents to coordinate with local law enforcement, respect certain restraints, or follow certain procedures. These policies wouldn't have the force of law, but they would constrain federal enforcement practices.
Court decisions could also shape immigration enforcement practices. If courts consistently found that federal enforcement practices violated constitutional rights, federal agencies would have to change practices. But this requires sustained litigation and sympathetic judges.
State and local political pressure could also affect federal decisions. If federal immigration enforcement becomes politically toxic enough, federal officials might moderate practices to avoid further conflict. But this requires maintaining political opposition and public pressure over time.
International legal frameworks might also influence U. S. practices. International human rights standards, conventions on migrants' rights, and international legal norms could indirectly constrain U. S. practices through diplomatic pressure.
What all of these approaches share is that they require political change. The Constitution gives federal authority over immigration, and that's unlikely to change. But how that authority is exercised can change through legislation, executive policy, or sustained political pressure.
The Broader Federalism Lesson: When Systems Depend on Restraint
The Minnesota immigration enforcement situation illustrates a broader principle about federalism: systems that divide power work only when power holders exercise restraint. When restraint disappears, the system reveals its vulnerabilities.
This isn't unique to immigration. It applies to any area where the Constitution gives one level of government overwhelming authority. If that authority is exercised without restraint or respect for the other level of government, conflict becomes inevitable.
The Civil War was ultimately about federalism. The Constitution gave the federal government authority over interstate commerce and immigration, but didn't give states the authority to nullify federal law. Southern states, facing federal authority they opposed, eventually attempted to secede. The federal government responded with military force. Over 600,000 people died in a conflict that was fundamentally about the limits of federalism.
The lesson from the Civil War was enshrined in the Reconstruction Amendments. Federal authority was clarified as supreme. But the system still depends on federal restraint. When federal officials exercise their power aggressively and states have no legal remedy, the system's foundation is threatened.
This doesn't mean another civil conflict is likely. Modern America has much more integrated government and much stronger democratic institutions. But it does mean that federalism's stability depends on political actors respecting its constraints, even when they have the power to violate them.
When those political actors decide that electoral benefits from aggressive action outweigh the costs of violating federalism norms, the system's assumptions break down. This is what happened in Minnesota.
The remedy isn't constitutional. It's political and cultural. It requires federal officials to respect state sovereignty even when the Constitution gives them power to override it. It requires states to cooperate with federal authority even when they disagree with how it's exercised. It requires all political actors to prioritize system preservation over short-term political advantage.
These aren't constitutional requirements. They're behavioral norms that make the constitutional system work.
FAQ
What is the constitutional basis for federal immigration authority?
The Constitution gives Congress power over naturalization in Article I, Section 8. Courts have interpreted this clause to give Congress and the executive broad authority over immigration, including who can enter the country, who can stay, and how immigration is enforced. This power is nearly absolute, and states have very limited authority to regulate immigration.
Why can't states prevent federal immigration enforcement operations within their borders?
The Constitution's Supremacy Clause makes federal law supreme over state law in areas of federal authority. Immigration is a federal matter under constitutional law. States can't use their police powers to obstruct federal law enforcement, even if federal enforcement causes local problems. States can refuse to cooperate with federal enforcement, but they can't legally prevent federal agents from operating.
What are the legal tools available to states to challenge federal immigration enforcement?
States can challenge federal immigration enforcement through federal court litigation, arguing that enforcement practices violate the Constitution. They can argue Fourth Amendment violations (unreasonable stops), Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violations (discriminatory enforcement), or Fifth Amendment Due Process violations. They can also sue to block specific federal policies. However, litigation is slow, and courts are reluctant to restrict federal immigration authority.
Can governors use the National Guard to oppose federal immigration enforcement?
Governors control the National Guard and can deploy it for state emergencies. However, they can't deploy it to directly oppose federal authority. If a governor deployed the National Guard to prevent federal agents from operating, the president could invoke the Insurrection Act and deploy federal troops to override state authority. National Guard can support state law enforcement and protect civilians, but it can't be used to directly confront federal immigration enforcement.
What would happen if a state criminally prosecuted a federal immigration agent for actions taken during federal duties?
States can attempt to prosecute federal officials for state crimes, including crimes committed while performing federal duties. However, federal courts can intervene in these cases and may shield federal agents from prosecution by concluding the agent was acting under valid federal authority. The federal government can assert that the agent was acting under federal authority and invoke doctrines like qualified immunity that protect federal officials from liability.
What would Congress need to do to constrain federal immigration enforcement authority?
Congress could establish warrant requirements for immigration stops, create federal-state coordination mechanisms, impose standards on immigration enforcement practices, eliminate qualified immunity for federal agents in certain cases, or limit federal immigration agencies' budgets and authority. However, Congress is unlikely to constrain immigration enforcement when the political party supporting aggressive enforcement controls Congress.
Why didn't Minnesota officials escalate their response to federal immigration enforcement operations?
Minnesota officials faced a stark choice: escalate confrontation with federal forces or seek legal remedies through courts. Direct confrontation risked triggering the Insurrection Act, which would bring federal military forces into the state. The constitutional and practical risks of direct confrontation are so severe that elected officials chose instead to pursue legal challenges, activate the National Guard for state purposes, and investigate federal conduct through state authorities.
Is federal immigration authority unlimited under the Constitution?
Federal immigration authority is very broad, but it's not unlimited. The Constitution still applies to federal immigration enforcement. Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable stops, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection guarantees, and Fifth Amendment Due Process requirements all constrain federal immigration enforcement. However, courts give federal immigration authority more deference than other areas of federal law, making constitutional constraints more theoretical than practical in many situations.
Could other countries' federal systems offer lessons for America?
Canada, Australia, and Germany all have federal systems with immigration as a federal power, but they include mechanisms for federal-state coordination, established processes for conflict resolution, and expectations of consultation between federal and state authorities. America's federal system relies more on separation of powers and less on institutionalized coordination. Learning from other federations would require legislative reform to establish coordination mechanisms.
What would it take to fundamentally change federal immigration authority?
Federal immigration authority is constitutionally established and very broad. Changing it would require either a constitutional amendment, which is extremely difficult, or sustained legislative reform if political alignment changes. Constitutional amendment would require overwhelming political consensus and would be extraordinary. Legislative reform is more realistic if the political party opposing aggressive immigration enforcement gains control of Congress and the presidency.
Conclusion: The Fragility of Federalism Without Restraint
Minnesota's struggle against federal immigration enforcement exposes a fundamental truth about American federalism: the system works only when federal officials exercise restraint. The Constitution gives the federal government nearly absolute authority over immigration. States have few tools to prevent federal enforcement. Local officials can object, investigate, and litigate, but they can't stop federal operations.
This isn't a bug in the constitutional system. It's a feature. Immigration is a national matter that affects the entire country. Allowing individual states to veto federal immigration policy would paralyze federal authority. The Constitution is right to give the federal government control over who can be in the country and how immigration is regulated.
But the system depends on federal officials respecting state sovereignty in other areas and exercising immigration authority reasonably. When federal officials deploy massive enforcement operations against a state's wishes, aggressively pursue enforcement that states oppose, and threaten to invoke the Insurrection Act, the system's assumptions collapse.
What Minnesota discovered is that having limited legal tools available doesn't mean states are powerless. States can pursue litigation that creates legal obstacles and delays federal operations. States can activate the National Guard to support local law enforcement and protect civilians. States can refuse to cooperate with federal enforcement, forcing federal agencies to operate independently. States can investigate federal misconduct and maintain public opposition to federal policies.
But none of these tools can actually stop federal immigration enforcement. They can slow it, constrain it, and create political pressure against it. They can establish that the state disagrees and is using available tools to resist. But they can't prevent federal operations.
This imbalance is constitutionally permissible. It's not necessarily unjust. Federal immigration authority is legitimate, and states' inability to veto federal policy is by design. What's unjust is when that federal authority is exercised abusively, without restraint, and against clear state opposition that's constitutionally irrelevant.
The solution isn't constitutional change. It's political and cultural. It requires federal officials to voluntarily restrain their exercise of federal authority, respect state concerns, and cooperate with state and local governments even when the Constitution doesn't require them to do so.
When political incentives align against this restraint, when federal officials gain more from aggressive action than from cooperation, the system breaks down. This is what happened in Minnesota. What emerged from that situation was not legal resolution, but political standoff. Federal officials pursued operations despite state opposition. State officials pursued legal challenges that were slow and of limited effectiveness. Both sides dug in for a conflict that the Constitution permits the federal government to win.
The long-term solution is political change. If the political party supporting aggressive immigration enforcement loses power, its successor could substantially reorganize how immigration is enforced. It could establish federal-state coordination mechanisms. It could impose restraints on federal authority that go beyond what the Constitution requires. It could rebuild the norms of restraint that federalism depends on.
But until that political change comes, states will continue to face situations where they have legal authority over their territory but constitutional limitations on their ability to direct what happens within that territory. They'll continue to watch federal operations they oppose and be unable to stop them. They'll continue to experience the gap between sovereignty and actual power, between authority and ability to enforce it.
This gap is the central paradox of American federalism. It's been part of the system since 1787. It will remain part of the system unless dramatic political or constitutional change occurs. Understanding this gap, recognizing its implications, and respecting it even when it seems unjust is crucial for preserving the federal system itself. For Minnesota and other states in similar situations, the hard truth is that understanding the constraints is the first step toward working effectively within them.
