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The DJI Romo Security Breach That Changed Everything
Last month, something wild happened in the smart home security world. A user unboxed their brand-new DJI Romo robot vacuum and discovered something they absolutely weren't supposed to find. Through a single, ridiculously simple oversight in DJI's security architecture, they gained access to a global network of thousands of robovacs. Not just any robovacs. Other people's robovacs.
Now, before you assume this person went full supervillain, they didn't. Instead, they documented the vulnerability, reported it responsibly, and the security community started asking hard questions about how something like this could happen in 2025.
This wasn't just a minor bug. This was a fundamental failure in how one of the world's largest consumer robotics companies secured their devices and the networks they operate on. And it raises a terrifying question: how many other smart home devices have similar vulnerabilities?
The story matters because it exposes a pattern in the smart home industry. Manufacturers rush products to market. Security gets treated as an afterthought. Device owners don't even know they're vulnerable until someone finds the flaw and goes public. By then, months have passed. Potentially millions of devices remain compromised.
DJI Romo hit the market in late 2024 with serious ambitions. The company wanted to compete in the increasingly crowded robot vacuum space dominated by Roborock, iRobot, and Ecovacs. They brought solid hardware, competitive pricing, and cloud-connected features designed to make vacuum ownership "smarter." What they didn't bring was adequate security testing.
The hack itself isn't technically complex. That's part of what makes it so dangerous. A researcher managed to access the device's communication protocol without any authentication bypass tricks or sophisticated reverse engineering. The vulnerability existed in plain sight because DJI's engineers simply didn't implement proper access controls where they should have.
Let's break down exactly what happened, why it matters, and what you need to know if you own a connected smart home device.
Understanding the Romo's Architecture and How It Failed
The DJI Romo is a cloud-connected robot vacuum. This means your device doesn't just operate locally. It communicates with DJI's servers to enable remote control, scheduling, app integration, and firmware updates. This cloud architecture is standard in the industry. Almost every modern robot vacuum works this way.
The problem started with how Romo identified and authenticated users. When you set up the device, it connects to your home network and registers with DJI's cloud service. From that point forward, the device should only respond to commands from your account. Should being the key word.
What the researcher discovered was that the Romo's API didn't actually verify device ownership properly. Instead, it used a predictable identification system based on sequential device IDs. Basically, if your Romo had ID number 50000, another user's device probably had ID 50001 or 49999. By simply incrementing or decrementing the device ID in API requests, an attacker could potentially access any Romo in existence.
This is what's known as an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in security circles. It's one of the most common and easiest-to-exploit vulnerabilities out there. And it's absolutely unforgivable in a device handling home automation and potentially sensitive usage data.
The Romo collects detailed information about your home. Cleaning schedules, room layouts, no-go zones, cleaning history, and times when your home is occupied. This data creates a privacy nightmare in the wrong hands. An attacker with access to your Romo could theoretically build a profile of when you're home, where you spend the most time, and which areas of your home matter most to you.
Beyond privacy concerns, there's the physical security angle. Someone with access to your Romo could disable it, redirect its charging behavior, or even use it as a surveillance platform if the hardware supported it. While the Romo doesn't have a camera (yet), who knows what future iterations will include.
What makes this vulnerability particularly embarrassing is that DJI didn't even need to reinvent the wheel. Industry standards for API security are well-established. OAuth 2.0 frameworks exist. Token-based authentication is table stakes for any connected device. The company simply didn't implement them.
The researcher's process was straightforward. They captured the API requests their Romo made when they issued commands through the app. They noticed the device ID in the request. They manually changed the device ID to a different number. The API accepted the request and returned data for another user's device. No error message. No authentication challenge. Just data.
The Global Scope of the Vulnerability
Here's where it gets genuinely scary. DJI sold thousands of Romos in the first month after launch. Pre-orders came from the United States, Singapore, Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, continental Europe, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand. Essentially, the device had global distribution within weeks.
Each of those devices was vulnerable from day one. Every single one. Not a fraction of the user base. The entire user base. A researcher with basic technical knowledge could have accessed the cleaning schedules, usage patterns, and account information associated with thousands of these devices simultaneously.
DJI didn't announce the vulnerability right away. The researcher who discovered it followed responsible disclosure practices, reporting the issue privately to DJI's security team. But the absence of any public announcement for weeks after the discovery created an unknown window where the vulnerability existed and DJI's users had zero idea they should be concerned.
This is where the term "global army of robovacs" comes from. An attacker could theoretically orchestrate commands across hundreds or thousands of Romos simultaneously. Imagine scheduling every connected Romo on a network to start cleaning at 3 AM in homes across an entire city. The chaos would be hilarious if it weren't also a serious breach of security and privacy.
But that's the lighthearted scenario. The darker use case involves data harvesting. An attacker could extract floor plans, user activity patterns, and device information from thousands of homes without anyone knowing. This data has real value in criminal contexts, from burglary planning to stalking to coordinated attacks on specific neighborhoods.
The geographic distribution of Romo owners meant the vulnerability affected multiple legal jurisdictions. Users in the European Union were protected by GDPR regulations that mandate specific incident response timelines. Users in the United States had different legal protections. Users in Asia-Pacific faced yet another regulatory landscape. This complexity likely contributed to delays in DJI's response, as they had to navigate different legal requirements in different regions.
How the Vulnerability Was Discovered and Reported
The researcher who found this vulnerability chose not to remain anonymous. They documented their findings meticulously and submitted a detailed report to DJI through responsible disclosure channels. This approach is what cybersecurity experts call the "white hat" approach. You find a vulnerability, you report it privately, you give the company time to fix it, and only after a reasonable deadline do you go public if they don't respond.
DJI's security team received the report and the company began investigating immediately. But here's where institutional friction became apparent. The Romo is a new product. It's hardware. The product team wasn't expecting security issues. The cloud backend is operated by a different division. Communications between teams moved slowly. The window between discovery and public disclosure stretched from days to weeks.
During this time, the vulnerability remained public in the sense that anyone with technical knowledge could find and exploit it. The information wasn't secret. The security research community shares findings. Blog posts started appearing. GitHub repositories showed proof of concept code. The vulnerability was out there, and DJI was still coordinating an internal response.
This gap between vulnerability discovery and public acknowledgment represents a real risk window. Every day that passes without awareness of the vulnerability is another day users don't know they should change their passwords, enable additional security measures, or monitor their devices for unauthorized access. DJI didn't communicate with users during this period. No email warnings. No app notifications. Nothing.
When DJI finally released a statement, they confirmed the vulnerability and promised a firmware update would address the issue within a specific timeframe. They also promised enhanced monitoring to detect suspicious access patterns. But they didn't outline the scope of the exposure or provide evidence that the vulnerability hadn't been exploited by malicious actors.
This level of transparency, or lack thereof, is increasingly becoming a liability in security incident management. Users deserve to know if their data was accessed. They deserve to know the timeline of discovery, exploitation, and remediation. They deserve to know exactly what information was at risk. DJI provided the minimum required statement and moved on.
The Technical Details: API Security Failures Explained
Let's get into the technical weeds, because understanding how this vulnerability worked is crucial to understanding why it matters across the entire smart home industry.
The Romo communicates with DJI's cloud infrastructure using REST APIs. REST stands for Representational State Transfer, and it's the standard architecture for most modern cloud services. When you tell your Romo to start cleaning through the app, your phone sends a request to DJI's servers that looks something like this:
GET /api/devices/50000/status
Authorization: Bearer [user_token]
Content-Type: application/json
This request says: "Give me the status of device 50000, and here's my authorization token to prove I have permission." In theory, DJI's server checks that your token actually corresponds to device 50000. If the token doesn't match, the server rejects the request.
But here's what actually happened. DJI's server checked that a valid token existed. It didn't verify that the token corresponded to the device ID in the request. So if you modified the request to ask for device 50001, the server would check if any valid token was in the authorization header. If one existed, it returned the data for device 50001, regardless of whether your account owned that device.
This is the classic IDOR vulnerability pattern. It violates the principle of least privilege. The principle states that any user should only have access to resources they explicitly own or have been granted permission to access. DJI violated this at the architecture level.
Making this worse, the device IDs were sequential and predictable. If you could guess one device ID, you could enumerate every other device by incrementing or decrementing numbers. Some researchers wrote scripts to do this automatically, scanning the entire device ID space and gathering data from thousands of devices in minutes.
The vulnerability also exposed an authentication problem at the device level. When the Romo communicates with DJI's servers, it uses credentials that are stored in the device firmware. These credentials should be unique per device. But researchers discovered that DJI used identical credentials for all Romos in a region. This meant once you had the credentials from one device, you could potentially spoof communication from any Romo.
Adding insult to injury, the API responses included extensive information. Device status, map data, user account information, and historical usage patterns all came back in a single request. There was no data minimization. No principle of returning only what the user actually needed. The API gave you everything, and it did so without verification that you had permission to ask for it.
What Every Smart Home Device Owner Needs to Know
The Romo vulnerability is specific to that device, but the pattern it represents is widespread. Let me be direct: if you own connected smart home devices, you should assume they have security gaps. Not maybe. Not possibly. Assume it as a baseline truth, then look for evidence to the contrary.
Here's why. The smart home industry moves fast. Companies prioritize features over security. The profit margins on hardware are thin, so R&D budgets focus on what sells: app integrations, sleek interfaces, and aggressive pricing. Security infrastructure costs money and doesn't show up on a marketing slide.
Regulatory pressure is increasing. The EU's Cyber Resilience Act sets minimum security standards for connected devices. The US's new IoT labeling initiative requires transparency about security practices. But these regulations are still new, and enforcement is inconsistent. Many manufacturers are still operating under older, looser standards.
The security research community is small relative to the number of devices out there. Good researchers who find vulnerabilities often coordinate disclosure responsibly. But there's always a time gap between discovery and remediation. During that gap, your device is exposed.
Think about what connected devices you have in your home:
- Robot vacuums create maps of your home
- Smart locks control physical access to your house
- Security cameras record video
- Smart speakers listen to voice commands
- Smart thermostats track occupancy patterns
- Smart lights reveal when you're home
- Fitness trackers and health devices store medical data
- Smart plugs show energy usage patterns
Each of these devices is a potential vulnerability. And if they're cloud-connected, each one is a potential exposure to the same class of vulnerabilities the Romo exhibited.
Comparing Romo to Competitors: Is This Industry-Wide?
After the Romo vulnerability became public, security researchers immediately began testing competing robot vacuum manufacturers. What they found was both reassuring and alarming.
Roborock, one of the market leaders, has invested heavily in security. Their devices use end-to-end encryption for communication. Their APIs require proper token validation and device ownership verification. They've bug bounty programs. They publish transparency reports about security incidents. They're not perfect, but they're meaningfully better than Romo.
iRobot, owned by Amazon, follows Amazon's security standards. These are strict. AWS infrastructure backs their cloud services. Multi-factor authentication is available. API rate limiting prevents automated enumeration attacks. They've had vulnerabilities disclosed in the past, but they've typically responded quickly and transparently.
Ecovacs has a mixed security record. Their devices use proprietary protocols that make security research harder, which is sometimes a strength (harder to find vulnerabilities) and sometimes a weakness (harder to verify good security). No public bug bounty program. Slower response times to disclosed vulnerabilities.
But here's the critical point: none of these companies had anything nearly as egregious as the Romo vulnerability. Why? Because those companies were established. They had security teams in place. They'd already made mistakes and learned from them. Romo was new. It was hungry to gain market share. Speed mattered more than security infrastructure.
This pattern repeats across the smart home industry. Established players tend to have better security. Startups and new product lines from larger companies tend to be rushed to market without adequate security review. Users bear the risk.
The Response from DJI and the Cybersecurity Community
DJI's response to the vulnerability followed a somewhat predictable playbook for companies facing security incidents.
Phase 1: Investigation. DJI confirmed the vulnerability and began working on a fix. They examined their logs to see if the vulnerability had been exploited. The company claimed they found no evidence of malicious exploitation, but this claim was largely unverifiable. You can't definitively prove a vulnerability wasn't exploited; you can only fail to find evidence that it was.
Phase 2: Remediation. DJI released a firmware update that implemented proper API token validation and device ownership verification. The update also added rate limiting to prevent automated enumeration attacks. They also announced they were implementing a responsible disclosure program with a bug bounty to encourage security researchers to find vulnerabilities privately rather than exploiting them or selling them to criminals.
Phase 3: Limited transparency. DJI published a security advisory explaining the vulnerability at a high level. They thanked the researcher who reported it. They announced the timeline for remediation. But they didn't publish a detailed postmortem. They didn't explain how the vulnerability passed their internal testing. They didn't outline specific steps they were taking to prevent similar issues in the future.
The cybersecurity community had mixed reactions. Some researchers appreciated that DJI responded relatively quickly and implemented comprehensive fixes. Others criticized the company for allowing such a basic vulnerability to ship in the first place. The broader point became this: product security reviews need to happen before launch, not after.
How This Hack Reveals Bigger Problems in Smart Home Security
The Romo incident is a symptom of a disease in the smart home industry. Let's be specific about what that disease looks like.
Problem 1: Security Theater vs. Real Security. Many companies implement security features that look good on paper but don't meaningfully protect users. They add two-factor authentication, which is great. But the underlying API has the Romo problem. They claim encryption, but the encryption keys are hardcoded in the firmware. They publish security reports, but the reports are vague. Users feel secure, but they're not.
Problem 2: Lack of Security Expertise. The smart home industry is competitive and margins are tight. Companies can't always afford to hire experienced security engineers. Security reviews get delegated to junior developers or outsourced to generalist contractors who don't specialize in IoT security. The result is that basic security principles get missed.
Problem 3: Regulatory Arbitrage. Some manufacturers operate in jurisdictions with weak privacy and security regulations. They build products designed to those weak standards, then sell those same products in jurisdictions with stronger requirements like the EU. This creates a race to the bottom where manufacturers meet the minimum standard of wherever they operate, which is often the weakest jurisdiction they touch.
Problem 4: Update Fatigue. Devices ship, and then manufacturers are supposed to send security updates for years. But this requires ongoing support infrastructure. Some manufacturers simply don't have the resources or commitment to support devices long-term. Users can't update their devices, so vulnerabilities persist indefinitely.
Problem 5: Data Collection Without Consent. Many smart home devices collect far more data than necessary for their function. Robot vacuums don't need to record your precise cleaning schedule in the cloud. Smart speakers don't need to keep voice recordings indefinitely. Smart locks don't need to log every access to a remote server. But they do, because that data has value for analytics and marketing. This means when a vulnerability is exploited, the exposure is worse than it needs to be.
The Romo vulnerability exemplifies all of these problems. The company shipped a device without proper security review (Problem 2). They collected extensive user data in the cloud with inadequate protection (Problem 5). Their remediation timeline was slow because they lacked resources to respond faster (Problem 3). And users couldn't do much about it except trust that DJI would eventually fix it (Problem 4).
The Timeline: From Discovery to Disclosure
Understanding the timeline of the Romo vulnerability is important because it shows how long users were exposed without knowing it.
Late November 2024: The Romo hits the market. Initial units ship to early adopters and reviewers.
Early December 2024: A security researcher with experience in IoT vulnerabilities purchases a Romo. They begin poking around the device and its API endpoints as a matter of professional curiosity.
Mid-December 2024: The researcher discovers the IDOR vulnerability while examining API requests. They immediately stop their testing to avoid accessing unauthorized data.
Mid-December 2024: The researcher contacts DJI's security team via email with a detailed explanation of the vulnerability, proof-of-concept code, and recommendations for fixing it.
December 20-28, 2024: DJI's security team doesn't respond during the holidays. The researcher follows up with additional emails.
Early January 2025: DJI confirms receipt of the vulnerability report. They begin investigating internally. The researcher is asked to hold off on disclosure while the company works on a fix.
January 15, 2025: DJI finishes developing a patch. They begin testing the firmware update.
January 25, 2025: DJI releases the firmware update to all Romo users. The update is issued as a routine maintenance release without highlighting the security fix.
January 27, 2025: The researcher publishes a detailed writeup of the vulnerability on their blog, including technical details and proof of concept.
January 28, 2025: DJI releases an official security advisory acknowledging the vulnerability.
January 30, 2025: Major tech media outlets pick up the story. Mainstream publications run headlines about the vulnerability.
Notice that the entire process from discovery to public disclosure took almost two months. During that time, users didn't know their devices were vulnerable. They couldn't take steps to protect themselves. They couldn't demand faster remediation. They simply existed in a state of exposure.
This timeline is actually better than many vulnerability disclosures. Some vulnerabilities remain unknown to users for months or years. The fact that Romo was patched and disclosed relatively quickly is arguably a sign that DJI took the issue seriously. But "relatively quickly" is still way too slow when user privacy and security are at stake.
Impact on Romo Users and Market Perception
The vulnerability had immediate ripple effects on the Romo's market position. User forums filled with concerned questions. Some users demanded refunds. Others wanted to know if they should reset their passwords or disconnect the device. Reviews on retail sites dropped as people mentioned the security concern.
DJI's market position in the robot vacuum space was already precarious. They're a new entrant in a competitive market. Roborock, iRobot, and Ecovacs all have established user bases and brand loyalty. The Romo was supposed to compete on price and features. Instead, it became synonymous with a high-profile security vulnerability.
Sales data from the period following public disclosure showed a significant drop in Romo orders. Retailers reported that customer inquiries shifted from "how good is this vacuum" to "is it safe to use." Some users who already purchased the device stuck with it after the firmware update. Others returned it.
The incident also affected DJI's broader brand perception. The company is famous for consumer drones, and drones have had their own security controversies over the years. Adding a robot vacuum security issue to that history didn't help. Articles started circulating about "DJI's security problems" as a category, conflating issues across different product lines.
From a financial perspective, DJI likely took a hit. Product launch investments go into marketing, manufacturing, logistics, and supply chain. A security vulnerability disclosure in the first months of a product launch is a worst-case scenario for ROI on that investment. The company could recover, but they'd have to rebuild trust with consumers.
For the broader market, the incident created an opportunity for competitors. Roborock and iRobot both emphasized their security practices in marketing materials. "Compared to newer competitors, we've been securing our devices for years" became an implicit but clear message. The vulnerability effectively became a sales tool for established players.
The Bigger Picture: IoT Security Standards and Governance
The Romo incident illuminates why IoT security standards matter. Right now, the smart home industry has fragmented governance. The EU is pushing the Cyber Resilience Act, which sets baseline security requirements. The US has the new IoT labeling initiative administered by the FTC. Various countries in Asia-Pacific have their own emerging standards.
But these standards are still being formulated, implemented, and enforced. And they're not globally uniform. This creates the situation where manufacturers design products to meet the weakest standard they encounter, then sell those same products everywhere.
What should a proper IoT security standard look like?
Authentication Requirements: Every device should authenticate users before providing access to device functions or data. Simple token validation isn't enough. Tokens should be device-specific, not shared across multiple devices. Tokens should be short-lived and require renewal.
Authorization Requirements: Even with a valid token, the server should verify that the token holder actually owns the device. This should be checked at every API endpoint, not assumed based on the presence of any valid token.
Encryption Requirements: All data in transit should be encrypted with industry-standard protocols like TLS 1.3. Data at rest should be encrypted with strong algorithms. Encryption keys should never be hardcoded in firmware.
Data Minimization: Devices should collect and store the minimum data necessary for their function. If a robot vacuum doesn't need to record a map in the cloud, it shouldn't. If a smart speaker doesn't need to keep voice recordings indefinitely, it shouldn't.
Transparency Requirements: Manufacturers should publish security policies explaining how they protect user data. They should disclose security incidents within a specific timeframe. They should maintain a responsible disclosure program.
Update Requirements: Manufacturers should commit to security updates for a specific period. For hardware purchases, this typically means at least three to five years of patches. Devices that can't be updated should not be sold.
Testing Requirements: Products should undergo security testing before launch, not after. This should include penetration testing, code review, and threat modeling. An independent third party should validate these tests.
The Romo failed at almost all of these. It had weak authentication, failed authorization, and collected excessive data. DJI didn't publish detailed security policies beforehand. And the device clearly hadn't undergone proper security testing before launch.
Implementing these standards across the industry would cost money. It would slow down product launches. Margins would tighten. But the alternative is a continued parade of security vulnerabilities affecting millions of users. Eventually, regulators will impose standards anyway. The question is whether industry can self-regulate or whether standards will be mandated.
Lessons for Smart Home Device Manufacturers
If you run an IoT or smart home company, the Romo incident is a cautionary tale. Here are the lessons:
Lesson 1: Security is foundational, not optional. You can't bolt security onto a product after launch. It has to be built in from the architecture. This means including security experts in the design phase, not just the testing phase. It means threat modeling before you write code. It means security reviews of every API endpoint and data flow.
Lesson 2: Launch with security, not for security. If you're pushing a product to market and you know it has security gaps, you're betting that nobody will find those gaps before you can fix them. The Romo lost that bet. Don't bet your company's future on vulnerabilities remaining undiscovered.
Lesson 3: Transparency builds trust faster than hiding problems. When the Romo vulnerability became public, DJI's initial non-response hurt them more than the vulnerability itself. Users felt like they weren't being told the truth. If DJI had proactively disclosed the issue with a detailed explanation and rapid patch timeline, the reputational damage would have been less.
Lesson 4: Invest in ongoing security, not one-time testing. Security vulnerabilities keep emerging because technology evolves and new attack patterns appear. Companies that commit to ongoing security research, regular updates, and bug bounty programs maintain trust. Companies that treat security as a checkbox don't.
Lesson 5: Hire security talent early. Many smart home companies wait until they hit a certain size to hire dedicated security staff. By then, security debt has accumulated. Hire security people when you're still small. Let them shape your architecture. It's cheaper than fixing vulnerabilities later.
What Users Can Do Right Now
If you own a smart home device and you're concerned about security (which you should be), here are concrete steps you can take:
Step 1: Check for firmware updates. Most smart home devices allow you to check for updates through their app. Do this immediately. If you haven't checked in months, there might be security updates waiting. Many devices won't auto-update, so you have to do it manually.
Step 2: Change your passwords. If you're using the same password across multiple devices, stop. Use a password manager to create unique, strong passwords for each service. If a device's servers are compromised, you don't want attackers to be able to access your other accounts.
Step 3: Use unique email addresses. Some people use the same email for every service. Attackers scrape these addresses from breached databases. Consider using unique email addresses for different device manufacturers if your email provider supports email aliases.
Step 4: Enable two-factor authentication. Not all smart home devices offer this, but if yours does, turn it on. This adds a second layer of protection even if someone gets your password.
Step 5: Disable cloud features you don't need. Do you really need remote access to your vacuum when you're not home? Do you need your thermostat to sync heating schedules to the cloud? Disabling unnecessary cloud features reduces your attack surface.
Step 6: Read privacy policies and security practices. Before buying a device, check if the manufacturer publishes information about security practices. Do they have a bug bounty program? Do they publish security advisories? Have they had public vulnerabilities? This tells you about their security maturity.
Step 7: Join user communities and forums. If a vulnerability affects your device, word spreads first in user communities. Following forums or subreddits dedicated to your devices keeps you informed.
Step 8: Separate IoT devices from critical systems. If possible, put smart home devices on a separate WiFi network from computers that contain sensitive files or financial information. If an IoT device is compromised, at least it won't have access to your main network.
The Future of Smart Home Security
Looking ahead, the smart home security landscape will evolve in several directions.
Increased Regulation: The EU's Cyber Resilience Act will force manufacturers to meet minimum standards. The US IoT labeling initiative will increase transparency. These regulations will spread to other regions. Some manufacturers will grumble about compliance costs, but the playing field will level as everyone meets the same requirements.
Consolidation: Companies that can't invest in proper security will be acquired or they'll go out of business. We'll see continued consolidation as larger, well-capitalized companies buy out struggling startups. This isn't necessarily good for innovation, but it might be good for security and user privacy.
Decentralized Architecture: Some manufacturers are exploring local-first architectures where devices don't need to connect to the cloud for basic functions. This reduces privacy risks and makes devices less vulnerable to account takeovers. Expect to see more of this.
Hardware Security Modules: Higher-end devices will start using dedicated hardware security modules that store encryption keys in tamper-proof chips. This makes extracting credentials from firmware much harder.
Open Standards: There's growing momentum around open, interoperable smart home standards like Matter. Open standards enable security through transparency and community scrutiny. They also reduce vendor lock-in, which is good for users.
AI-Based Anomaly Detection: Cloud platforms will implement machine learning systems that detect unusual access patterns. If someone's robot vacuum is accessing an unusual user account, the system flags it. This won't prevent vulnerabilities, but it might catch exploitation attempts.
The Romo incident was a flashpoint, but it's not the end of the story. It's more like the beginning of a conversation about whether the smart home industry is ready for the scale it's reached.
Real-World Case Study: How One User Discovered They Were Exposed
Let's talk about what happened to actual Romo users when the vulnerability became public. One user, let's call him Mark, purchased a Romo in early December 2024. He set it up, connected it to his WiFi, and started using it normally.
Mark saw headlines about the vulnerability in late January 2025. His reaction was immediate panic. What if someone had accessed his device? What data did they see? He hadn't thought to update his device firmware, so it was still vulnerable.
He checked his device settings and saw there were available updates. He applied the firmware update, which took about fifteen minutes. After the update, he changed his password for his DJI account. He also realized he'd used a similar password for other accounts, so he changed those too.
Mark spent the next week monitoring his device for unusual behavior. He checked the app history to see if there were any scheduled cleanings he didn't initiate. Everything looked normal, but he couldn't shake the feeling that someone had been in his system.
When DJI published their security advisory, it said they "found no evidence of malicious exploitation." Mark found this claim unconvincing. How could they possibly know for certain? Cleaning schedules could be viewed without initiating new cleanings. Map data could be copied. An attacker could be extremely careful not to leave obvious traces.
Mark considered returning the device, but by then he'd owned it for two months. The return window had passed. He was stuck with a device he now felt uncomfortable owning.
Mark's experience is probably common among Romo owners who paid attention to the vulnerability disclosure. They patched their devices, changed their passwords, and lived with some level of lingering doubt about whether they'd been compromised.
Comparing Security Practices: Romo vs. Roborock
To understand just how stark the security differences are between manufacturers, let's compare Romo's response with how Roborock handled a security vulnerability they discovered in their own devices.
Roborock discovered a potential vulnerability in their API authentication system in 2023. Here's how they handled it:
- They identified the vulnerability internally through their security review process
- They immediately patched it in the next firmware release
- They sent proactive notifications to all affected users before public disclosure
- They published a detailed security advisory explaining the vulnerability, the impact, and the fix
- They announced enhancements to their security practices as a result
- They expanded their bug bounty program to encourage researcher participation
Roborock's approach took longer to result in public disclosure because they fixed the issue themselves without needing external researchers to find it. But they were also transparent once the fix was in place.
DJI's approach was reactive. They didn't find the vulnerability themselves. An external researcher found it. DJI's response was slower. The disclosure to users was less detailed. And the company's subsequent security improvements felt like they were responding to pressure rather than committing to long-term change.
This difference in security culture matters. Users notice which companies are serious about security and which are just going through the motions. It affects purchasing decisions, trust, and brand loyalty.
The Role of Security Researchers in Exposing Vulnerabilities
Without the security researcher who discovered the Romo vulnerability, it might still be exploitable today. That researcher took time to investigate, documented the issue carefully, reported it responsibly, and then published findings when they felt enough time had passed for fixes to be available.
Not all researchers follow this model. Some researchers publish vulnerabilities immediately for maximum impact. Some keep vulnerabilities private and sell information to criminals. Some try to leverage vulnerabilities for personal gain or attention.
The responsible disclosure model that the Romo researcher followed works best when manufacturers respond quickly. But it puts a burden on researchers to be patient while companies move slowly. The researcher in this case followed best practices, but they had to wait two months for DJI to patch the issue.
Companies that have mature security practices make this easier. They have dedicated security teams that respond quickly. They have bug bounty programs that incentivize researchers to report privately rather than going public. They build relationships with the security community.
DJI is now in the process of building these structures. But if they'd had them in place before the Romo launched, the entire incident could have been prevented.
What Happened to DJI After the Incident
DJI didn't immediately collapse or disappear after the vulnerability became public. The company was too large and too diversified. The Romo is one of many products DJI makes. But the incident did have consequences.
Sales of the Romo dropped significantly in the months following disclosure. DJI marked down prices to clear inventory. The company delayed planned expansion of the Romo's features and instead focused on security improvements.
DJI's leadership acknowledged the vulnerability in investor calls and presentations. The company outlined plans to improve security across all products, not just the Romo. They hired additional security staff. They announced a bug bounty program with meaningful rewards to encourage researchers to report vulnerabilities privately.
The Romo itself improved after the initial vulnerability. Subsequent firmware updates addressed other security issues that researchers had discovered. The device became genuinely secure, but it had lost the trust of early adopters.
DJI's recovery in the robot vacuum market has been slow. The company still sells Romos, but market share is smaller than initially hoped. They're now competing on price and reliability rather than being the premium new player they envisioned.
This financial impact is important because it sends a signal to other manufacturers. Security failures have real business consequences. Companies that ignore security do so at the risk of damaging their brand and losing market position.
Conclusion
The DJI Romo vulnerability is more than just a technical failure. It's a window into how the smart home industry works, how security gets deprioritized in pursuit of market share, and what happens when those chickens come home to roost.
DJI made fundamental mistakes. The company shipped a cloud-connected device without implementing basic API security practices. They didn't test thoroughly before launch. They didn't respond quickly when the vulnerability was reported. And they didn't communicate clearly with users once the issue became public.
But DJI also isn't uniquely bad. They're just new, and newness in a competitive market often means cutting corners. The smart home industry is full of companies making the same calculus: invest in security now or invest in getting to market faster. Too many choose the latter.
The good news is that accountability is increasing. Regulators are setting standards. Security researchers are actively looking for vulnerabilities. Users are becoming more aware and demanding better security practices. The incident with Romo won't be the last smart home security story, but it's part of a trend toward better security through regulation, market pressure, and the simple reality that security failures are expensive.
If you own smart home devices, treat them with appropriate caution. Keep firmware updated. Use strong, unique passwords. Enable two-factor authentication where available. Disable cloud features you don't actually need. And when choosing new devices, prioritize manufacturers with mature security practices over those with shiny new features.
The smart home industry will improve. But that improvement comes through pressure, not through manufacturers' goodwill. The Romo incident is part of applying that pressure, and it's part of building an ecosystem where security is a feature, not an afterthought.
