Iran's Internet Collapse: What Happened and Why It Matters [2025]

Iran's Internet Collapse: What Happened and Why It Matters [2025]

Thursday started like any other day in Tehran. By 8 p.m. local time, it wasn't.

Iran's internet didn't just slow down. It didn't have intermittent outages. It nearly vanished entirely. Within minutes, one of the world's largest nations with over 90 million people became almost completely disconnected from the rest of the world. Not gradually. Not accidentally. Almost surgically.

This wasn't the first time Iran had pulled this switch. But the scale, the speed, and the context made it genuinely alarming. Because this time, it wasn't happening in isolation. It was happening amid massive, coordinated protests spreading through every major Iranian city, triggered by an economic crisis that had pushed ordinary people past their breaking point.

Internet monitoring firms saw it happen in real-time. Kentik's traffic analysis showed the collapse with eerie precision. Cloudflare reported near-total disconnection. NetBlocks confirmed it. IODA tracked it. Multiple independent sources all watching the same thing: a country systematically severing itself from global connectivity while its citizens took to the streets in anger.

Here's what actually happened, why it happened, and what it means for internet freedom, government control, and the fragile infrastructure connecting our world.

TL; DR

• Near-Total Blackout: Iran experienced a nearly complete internet shutdown affecting 90+ million people, with connectivity dropping 90-99% within minutes on Thursday evening.
• Economic Trigger: Nationwide protests erupted following a sharp currency devaluation that created severe goods shortages and price spikes affecting ordinary Iranians.
• Government Response: Iran's government orchestrated the blackout to suppress protests and prevent coordination among demonstrators and international communication.
• Real-Time Documentation: Multiple internet monitoring firms (Kentik, Cloudflare, NetBlocks, IODA) captured and reported the shutdown in real-time with precise technical data.
• Pattern of Control: This represents Iran's ongoing strategy of using internet shutdowns as a tool of political control, with previous incidents in 2019-2020.

During the protests, Iran experienced a near-total internet blackout with 90% of connectivity lost, leaving only minimal access for government and critical systems. Estimated data based on monitoring reports.

What Exactly Happened on Thursday Evening

The technical collapse was stunning in its precision. Around 11:30 a.m. Eastern Time on Thursday, which corresponded to 8 p.m. Tehran time, something switched off. Not gradually. Not with warnings. Just off.

Internet traffic across Iran didn't decrease by 20% or 50%. It collapsed by 90-99% in a matter of minutes. Think about that for a second. A country of 90 million people. Suddenly unable to access websites. Unable to use messaging apps. Unable to reach the outside world. Unable to coordinate with each other through digital means.

Amir Rashidi, an Iranian cybersecurity researcher working with the nonprofit Miaan Group, described it in stark terms: "I think we're at a near-total disconnection from the outside world now." Rashidi is someone who's studied internet control and digital repression intimately. When he says "near-total," he's not exaggerating for effect. He's describing what he's actually seeing in the data.

Doug Madory, director of internet analysis at Kentik, which tracks internet traffic globally, confirmed Rashidi's assessment. "Iran's internet has been in near-total blackout since around 11:30 a.m. on the U.S. east coast on Thursday." Madory provided the actual traffic data visualizations. The chart shows this wasn't gradual degradation. It was a cliff edge. A vertical drop.

What's significant here is that multiple independent monitoring organizations all detected and reported the same thing at the same moment. That's not coincidence. That's verification. Internet traffic monitors like NetBlocks, infrastructure company Cloudflare, and IODA all registered sudden drops simultaneously. David Belson, head of data insight at Cloudflare, told researchers: "We continue to see a small amount of traffic, but the country is effectively completely offline."

The "small amount of traffic" Belson mentions is important. It suggests that while almost everything was shut down, some government infrastructure and perhaps some critical systems remained online. This is typical of how these shutdowns work. You disable public connectivity while maintaining access for government operations and security apparatus. It's control theater, but it's effective theater.

What makes this particular blackout notable isn't just the scale. It's the timing. It happened right when protests were escalating across major Iranian cities. That's not a coincidence either. That's intentional policy.

The Economic Crisis That Sparked Everything

You can't understand why the government did this without understanding why people took to the streets in the first place. And that story starts with currency collapse.

At the end of December, something broke in Iran's economy. The Iranian rial, the country's currency, didn't just lose value. It experienced a sharp, sudden drop. We're not talking about gradual depreciation you might see in any economy. We're talking about a cliff. A currency crisis.

When your currency tanks that fast, everything else cascades. Immediately. The price of imported goods shot up. The availability of goods plummeted. Store shelves that had items a week earlier suddenly had gaps. Not in one city. In many cities. In the traditional bazaars of Tehran, shops were literally closed. The New York Times reported that some shops in Tehran's traditional bazaar had been shuttered for eleven straight days. Eleven days of lost revenue. Eleven days of no business. That's not normal. That's crisis.

Inflation skyrocketed. Prices for everyday items increased dramatically. Food got more expensive. Transportation costs climbed. The stuff that ordinary people buy to survive became dramatically less affordable on a timeline measured in days, not months.

This wasn't abstract economic policy affecting quarterly GDP numbers. This was real, immediate, visceral impact on how people could feed their families and afford basic goods. When that happens, when the impact is that direct and that fast, people respond. Protests aren't theoretical responses to economic data. They're reactions to walking past an empty shelf where you expected to buy bread.

The situation had been building. Iran's economy had been under pressure for years due to international sanctions, political instability, and structural issues. But the trigger event was this currency shock. The sudden, visible drop that made the problem impossible to ignore or deny.

Internet traffic in Iran plummeted by 90-99% within minutes around 11:30 AM Eastern Time, indicating a near-total blackout. Estimated data based on reported observations.

Why Nationwide Protests Erupted

Protest movements don't emerge from nowhere. They emerge from grievance, from pain, from the feeling that nothing is changing and nobody is listening. The currency crisis provided the trigger, but the underlying conditions had been building.

Protesters weren't demanding abstract policy changes. They were demanding relief from immediate pain. The inability to buy food at reasonable prices. The uncertainty about whether tomorrow would be better or worse. The feeling that the system wasn't working for ordinary people.

What made these protests significant wasn't just their scale, though they were spreading through multiple major cities. It was their coordination, their persistence, and their willingness to take to streets despite knowing the risks. Protesting in Iran isn't a casual activity. There's real risk. The government response can be violent. But when people are suffering enough, when the alternative feels like continued suffering, they take that risk.

The protests weren't confined to one city or one neighborhood. They were citywide. They were national. That's significant because it suggests this wasn't a single flashpoint. This was widespread anger manifesting simultaneously across multiple locations. When that happens, it's not easily dismissed as troublemakers or a fringe element. It's indicative of broader discontent.

The government noticed. More than noticed. They watched the protests grow, watched them spread, watched people coordinate through social media and messaging apps, and made a decision. If we can't control the message, we'll control the medium.

The Government's Response: Crackdown and Disconnection

Iran's government has a specific playbook for responding to large-scale protests. Violence is one tool. Internet disconnection is another. Sometimes they're used sequentially. Sometimes simultaneously.

In this case, they chose to disconnect. And they chose to do it in a comprehensive way. This wasn't about slowing internet speeds to make certain apps unusable. This was about shutting down the internet almost entirely.

The Iranian government maintains tight control over the country's internet infrastructure. That's not speculation. That's documented policy. Iran has a state-controlled telecom company. The government has the ability to mandate ISP-level filtering and blocking. They have the technical capability to turn off internet access because they control the infrastructure that provides it.

Rashidi confirmed that the government was behind the blackout. When someone with his technical expertise and his position studying internet control in Iran makes that determination, it's not a hypothesis. It's an informed assessment based on data and evidence.

Why do this? What's the strategic thinking?

First, it prevents coordination. If protesters can't communicate through messaging apps, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, and other tools, they can't organize new protests or respond to police actions in real-time. If they can't use social media, they can't broadcast videos of government violence to domestic audiences or international media. If there's no connectivity, there's no distributed coordination.

Second, it prevents the spread of information. If the internet is down, people can't fact-check government statements. They can't share information about what's happening in other cities. They can't contact international journalists or human rights organizations. They can't make videos or take pictures and share them. Information becomes localized and limited to what they can see in their immediate vicinity.

Third, it's a show of force. It demonstrates government capability and control. It sends a message: we don't just monitor your internet. We can turn it off. Entirely. This isn't a power move that's subtle or ambiguous. It's stark and clear.

How Internet Monitoring Firms Detected the Blackout

The technical side of how we know what happened is actually fascinating. Because in a world where governments control information, it's remarkable that we can independently verify what's happening just by monitoring internet traffic patterns.

Kentik is a company that watches internet traffic globally. Imagine a network that tracks how data moves across the internet, where it's flowing from, where it's flowing to, how much is flowing. Kentik does that. When Iran's internet suddenly experiences a 90% drop in traffic, Kentik sees it immediately. They saw it at 11:30 a.m. Eastern Time. The chart they released showed the collapse graphically. Traffic just... stopped. This is real-time technical evidence.

Cloudflare, which provides internet infrastructure and security services globally, monitors connectivity from a different angle. They track how many requests they're receiving from Iran, how much data is flowing through their services. David Belson at Cloudflare confirmed the blackout through their data: the country was "effectively completely offline."

NetBlocks, which specializes in internet monitoring and human rights work, tracks internet connectivity specifically to identify disruptions during political events. They have detailed data on internet outages, their scope, their duration, their impact. They saw the same sudden drop everyone else did.

IODA (Internet Outage Detection and Analysis) is a system developed to monitor and track internet disruptions globally. It collects data from multiple sources and analyzes connectivity patterns. IODA detected the same shutdown.

What's remarkable about this layering of independent sources is that it makes denial difficult. If one monitoring service reported it, the government could claim technical issues or measurement errors. But when four independent technical organizations all report the same thing at the same moment with detailed data visualizations, the credibility becomes overwhelming.

These companies aren't political activists. They're not advocates. They're technical organizations that gather and analyze data. They have reputational incentives to be accurate because their business depends on being trusted by clients who rely on their data being correct. When they report something, it carries weight.

The data is publicly available. Anyone can go look at the charts. Anyone can see the dramatic drop. That's what makes internet monitoring services crucial for accountability. When governments try to control information, these technical organizations provide independent verification.

The chart illustrates the rapid decline in internet connectivity in Iran, dropping from 100% to nearly 1% within a few hours on Thursday evening. Estimated data based on reported figures.

Why Internet Shutdowns Don't Stay Secret

In an age where governments might assume they can control all information through their own media and channels, the existence of independent internet monitoring creates a problem for authoritarian governments. They can shut down the internet. They can block international media. They can prevent people from posting on social media. But they can't prevent the technical world from noticing and documenting what they've done.

Internet traffic data is, in some ways, immune to spin. You can create alternative narratives. You can control media. But you can't make traffic data show something it doesn't show. The internet either has 90% less traffic or it doesn't. The drop either happened in minutes or it didn't.

This creates a situation where large-scale internet shutdowns inevitably become known internationally. They're documented. They're analyzed. They become part of the historical record. That has implications for how governments think about using this tool. There's no secrecy possible. There's no plausible deniability. You shut down the internet, the world knows about it immediately.

The Iranian government presumably understood this. They didn't attempt to hide the blackout. They didn't claim it was accidental. They didn't offer technical explanations. They just did it. The assumption, presumably, is that suppressing protests domestically was worth the international attention and criticism.

The Pattern: Internet Shutdowns as Political Tool

This isn't the first time Iran has done this. This is part of a longer pattern. In 2019 and 2020, during protests over fuel price increases and other grievances, Iran's government shut down the internet. The pattern is recognizable: government faces protests, government responds with internet disconnection, chaos and lack of coordination among protesters, internet eventually comes back online.

What makes this tactic effective is that it breaks the coordination infrastructure modern movements rely on. People can still gather in person. You can still have street protests. But you can't organize new ones quickly. You can't respond to government moves in real-time. You can't spread information about what's happening in other cities. You lose what researchers call "the connective tissue" of modern movements.

The irony is that while this was effective in the age before smartphones and social media, it's become less effective in a world where many people have experience living with internet restrictions. People develop workarounds. They use VPNs when connectivity returns. They use mesh networks and peer-to-peer communication methods. They coordinate by phone. The tactic still disrupts, but it's less devastating than it might have been fifteen years ago.

But despite being less effective, governments still use it. Because even if it's not 100% effective, even if it only reduces coordination by 50%, that's still valuable to a government trying to suppress protests.

Historians of internet shutdowns have documented over 200 significant internet disruption events globally since 2015. Developing countries experience them far more frequently than developed ones. The countries that use them most extensively are those with less tolerance for dissent and less independent media. The pattern is consistent.

Impact on Business and Daily Life

When 90 million people lose internet connectivity, the economic impact extends far beyond the protest itself. This affects businesses, commerce, communication, remote work, education, everything that depends on connectivity.

Iranian companies doing business internationally suddenly can't access their servers, can't communicate with international partners, can't process orders or payments. E-commerce businesses go offline. Remote work becomes impossible. Financial transactions that depend on internet connectivity halt.

Educational institutions lose connectivity. Students studying remotely can't access their coursework. Online classes halt. Learning that was happening through digital means stops.

Healthcare services that depend on digital systems face disruption. Hospitals with electronic medical records systems may face challenges. Telemedicine becomes impossible.

The average person loses access to the apps and services they rely on. If you're waiting for important news, you can't check it. If you're trying to reach family members outside the country, you can't do it through internet means. If you need to access your bank account, you can't do it remotely. If you're trying to work remotely, you can't.

This isn't just an inconvenience. For many people, it's a genuine hardship. And it's a hardship that falls disproportionately on those least able to handle it. Wealthy people might have satellite internet or other workarounds. Most people don't.

The economic cost of a near-total internet shutdown for a country is substantial. Industry analysts have attempted to quantify the impact of past shutdowns. The numbers are significant. When you lose business transactions, when you lose productivity, when you lose the ability to move money electronically, the economic drag is real.

For a country already facing economic crisis, the decision to shut down the internet compounds the economic problems rather than solving them. Which suggests that the government calculates the political benefit of suppressing protests as more important than the economic cost of the shutdown. That's a telling priority statement.

Estimated data shows a significant drop in internet traffic detected by multiple monitoring firms during the blackout, validating the occurrence through independent sources.

International Response and Diplomatic Implications

When Iran's internet went down, the international response was swift. Internet freedom organizations issued statements. Human rights groups began documenting reports from inside the country. International media covered it immediately. The event became global news within hours.

The United States government has historically been critical of internet shutdowns and internet censorship. The Trump administration previously emphasized internet freedom as a foreign policy concern. The Biden administration has maintained similar positions. When an ally or strategic partner uses internet shutdowns, the U.S. generally responds diplomatically. When a country classified as authoritarian uses them, the response is typically criticism and concern.

European governments similarly emphasize digital rights and internet freedom as values. When internet shutdowns occur, they express concern through official channels and international bodies.

But international criticism of internet shutdowns faces a practical limitation: short of military intervention or severe economic sanctions, the international community has limited ability to force governments to maintain internet access. This creates a situation where internet shutdowns are essentially outside the reach of diplomatic enforcement. Countries can use them, face criticism, and continue using them because the cost of international criticism is lower than the domestic cost of allowing unchecked protest coordination.

However, there's a longer-term cost. Each time a country uses internet shutdowns, it reinforces its reputation as a government that fears information and doesn't trust its citizens. It signals to investors, to technology companies, to international partners that this is not a stable environment for digital business and digital investment. That has economic implications beyond the immediate shutdown.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry's website was reportedly down at the time of this publication. That detail is worth noting because it suggests that even government communication infrastructure was affected by the shutdown, or the government was actively restricting access to its own communications, which raises questions about the coordination and control of the shutdown itself.

Parallel Events: Internet Shutdowns in Other Countries

Iran isn't unique in using internet shutdowns. The tactic is increasingly common globally. During recent protest movements in various countries, governments have used internet restrictions. During elections in multiple nations, authorities have implemented shutdowns or severe slowdowns. During ethnic or political tensions, shutdowns have been employed.

Myanmar experienced severe internet shutdowns after the military coup. Demonstrations by Rohingya in 2020 were followed by complete internet blackouts in certain regions. Belarus has used internet restrictions during election-related protests. Hong Kong experienced limited shutdowns during pro-democracy demonstrations. Pakistan has used internet throttling and selective blocking during political protests.

The pattern is global, though it's concentrated in countries with less democratic governance. Democratic countries rarely implement near-total shutdowns, though they do implement selective blocking of specific platforms or services. The technical implementation differs, but the strategic goal is similar: reduce the coordination ability of those the government views as threatening.

What's different about Iran's case is the scale and completeness of the shutdown. This wasn't partial blocking. This wasn't throttling of specific services. This was a near-total disconnection. That indicates a level of technical capability and political willingness that's at the extreme end of the scale.

The Role of Internet Infrastructure Companies

Cloudflare's David Belson played a significant role in documenting and communicating what happened. As the head of data insight at one of the world's largest internet infrastructure companies, his assessment carries technical weight. When he says the country was "effectively completely offline," people listen. Companies like Cloudflare occupy a unique position. They run critical internet infrastructure globally. They have visibility into massive flows of traffic. They have data that governments often don't fully control.

This creates a complex situation. On one hand, these companies are often operating within countries that implement shutdowns or restrictions. They have to navigate government demands and restrictions while maintaining their business operations. On the other hand, when they document and report on shutdowns, they become sources of external accountability.

Cloudflare, to its credit, has published detailed information about internet shutdowns, about internet censorship globally, and about the technical aspects of how these things work. This makes them simultaneously valuable to internet researchers and activists, and potentially a target for government pressure.

Kentik, similarly, operates internet monitoring infrastructure that makes it possible to detect these events. Their traffic analysis data is valuable to researchers, to policymakers, to organizations concerned with internet freedom.

These companies don't control the shutdowns. They don't prevent them. But they make them visible and documentable. In a world where governments might hope to control the narrative around their own actions, the existence of independent technical infrastructure that monitors and documents what's happening creates a layer of accountability.

Estimated data shows that developing countries experience internet shutdowns three times more frequently than developed countries, highlighting a pattern of suppression in regions with less tolerance for dissent.

Technological Methods Behind Internet Shutdowns

How does a government actually shut down the internet for an entire country? The technical mechanisms are worth understanding because they reveal both the power and the limitations of centralized control.

Iran's internet infrastructure funnels through relatively centralized points. The country has multiple Internet Service Providers, but they're all state-controlled or state-regulated. To disconnect the country from global internet, the government can issue directives to these providers to stop routing international traffic. Imagine having a physical switch at the border that controls whether data flows in or out. It's not literally a single switch, but conceptually that's what happens. The ISPs receive instructions to stop accepting and routing international traffic.

This is different from the targeted censorship that Iran also implements regularly. Targeted censorship blocks specific sites (like social media platforms) or specific types of content. A full shutdown goes beyond that. It's the equivalent of cutting all phone lines, not just certain numbers.

The technical implementation involves Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) manipulation, changes to DNS routing, blocking of international gateways, and coordination across ISPs to ensure that no traffic flows internationally. It requires coordination at a national infrastructure level. It's not something that can be done accidentally or partially. It's a deliberate, coordinated decision made at a policy level and implemented technically.

Once this is implemented, you can maintain some internal traffic within the country (people can reach other people within Iran using domestic networks), but you can't reach outside the country, and outside information can't reach in. It's an information wall.

The reversal process typically takes longer than the shutdown. Turning it off is easy (relatively speaking). Turning it back on requires decisions about how much to restore, whether to maintain selective blocking, how to do it without creating more technical problems.

Cybersecurity Implications and Concerns

Internet shutdowns create cybersecurity concerns that extend beyond the immediate shutdown itself. When internet connectivity is restored after a shutdown, people often rush to reconnect. They need to check email, access financial accounts, connect with family. This creates a vulnerable moment.

Cybercriminals are aware of this pattern. After shutdowns, there's historically been an increase in phishing attempts, malware distribution, and other cyber attacks targeting people who are reconnecting and potentially less cautious in their haste to regain connectivity.

There's also the concern that during shutdowns, governments might implement additional monitoring or surveillance infrastructure. When you have a breakdown in normal operations, it creates an opportunity to reconfigure systems, add monitoring capabilities, or change how data flows through the network.

Security researchers and cybersecurity companies have documented cases where shutdowns were followed by new surveillance capabilities. This isn't proven in the Iranian case, but it's a recognized pattern worth noting.

For individuals and organizations inside Iran trying to maintain security and privacy, internet shutdowns create challenges. If you're relying on VPNs for privacy (to bypass normal censorship), those become impossible to use during total shutdowns. If you're trying to maintain secure backups, that becomes difficult. If you're trying to communicate securely with people outside the country, you lose all capability.

For organizations, the implications are different. Critical infrastructure, financial institutions, government systems may have backup connectivity or alternative systems. But many organizations don't. The shutdown affects them severely.

Historical Context: Previous Iranian Internet Shutdowns

This shutdown is part of a pattern specific to Iran's government approach to dissent. In 2009, during the Green Movement protests following contested elections, Iran implemented significant internet restrictions. These were partial rather than total, but they affected access to major platforms and international connectivity.

In 2019, during fuel price protests, Iran implemented near-total shutdowns lasting several days. The government's rationale was similar: suppress coordination among protesters, prevent information spread. The economic impact was documented and criticized internationally, but the shutdown remained in place.

In 2020, internet restrictions were implemented again during various protest movements. The pattern became established: when government faces large-scale dissent, internet shutdown is deployed as a response tool.

Each time, internet freedom organizations document it. Each time, there's international concern. Each time, the Internet Society and other digital rights organizations issue statements. And each time, it doesn't prevent the next shutdown.

The pattern suggests that the Iranian government has calculated that the international criticism and economic cost of shutdowns is acceptable compared to the domestic political cost of allowing protesters to coordinate freely. This is ultimately a statement about priorities and about confidence in one's ability to suppress dissent through other means if internet connectivity is available.

The sharp drop in the Iranian rial led to a rapid increase in inflation and protest intensity over a month. Estimated data illustrates the immediate economic and social impact.

The Bigger Picture: Internet Shutdowns and Global Trends

The Iranian shutdown is part of a concerning global trend. According to organizations that track internet freedom, the number of countries implementing internet shutdowns is increasing. The duration of shutdowns is increasing. The technical sophistication of shutdowns is increasing.

What was once a rare, dramatic event is becoming more routine. What was once considered an extreme measure is becoming normalized. Countries are learning from each other's playbooks. Governments are sharing technical knowledge about how to implement shutdowns.

This matters because it affects the fundamental right to information and communication. When internet shutdowns become a normalized tool of governance, it changes what's possible. It changes the baseline for what governments feel comfortable doing.

The countries that use shutdowns most frequently are also the countries with the weakest democratic institutions, the least press freedom, and the most authoritarian governance. This isn't coincidence. Internet shutdowns are a tool that makes sense primarily for governments that don't trust their citizens with information and don't feel secure with dissent.

But the concerning trend is that even some middle-income countries with somewhat democratic institutions have experimented with partial shutdowns or selective blocking. If the practice spreads, if it becomes normalized globally, the implications for internet freedom and human rights are significant.

Workarounds and Resistance Technologies

When governments shut down the internet, people develop workarounds. This is the human response to restriction. And while no workaround is perfect, understanding them matters.

VPN technology allows people to mask their location and encrypt their traffic, potentially getting around censorship and surveillance. However, VPNs are of limited use during total shutdowns because they require internet connectivity to function. You can't VPN your way out of a total disconnection.

Mesh networking technologies like Bridgefy or FireChat allow people to communicate locally without internet, device to device. These apps can be preloaded on phones. During shutdowns, people with these apps can communicate with others nearby, creating networks of local communication. These are effective for immediate local coordination but don't solve the problem of inability to reach outside information or communicate with distant family members.

Satellite internet, theoretically, could provide connectivity during shutdowns. But satellite internet requires hardware that's not widely distributed, is expensive, and is relatively easy for governments to detect and suppress. Iran's government has reportedly been particularly vigilant about suppressing satellite internet use.

Radio and broadcast methods can carry information, but they're limited to one-way transmission and are easily jammed or blocked by authorities.

The reality is that while people develop workarounds, none of them perfectly substitute for standard internet connectivity. Workarounds are partial, often unreliable, and frequently come with technical and legal risks. Complete internet shutdowns remain genuinely disruptive despite efforts to work around them.

What Gets Lost When the Internet Goes Down

When people analyze internet shutdowns, they sometimes focus narrowly on the protest coordination aspect. But the impact extends much further.

Education gets disrupted. Students who were taking online classes suddenly can't access materials. Exams that were scheduled get postponed. Learning comes to a halt.

Remote work becomes impossible. For people whose jobs depend on internet connectivity, the shutdown means no work, no income, during a period when many people are already economically vulnerable.

Healthcare disruption is significant. Patients trying to reach doctors can't do so. Hospitals using electronic medical record systems may face challenges. Emergency coordination becomes difficult if hospitals can't communicate with emergency services.

Family communication with people outside the country ceases. For a diaspora-connected country like Iran, this matters emotionally and practically. You can't reach family members to check if they're safe. You can't receive information about what's happening elsewhere.

Access to international news becomes impossible. People lose the ability to fact-check government claims against international reporting.

These impacts extend across society. The shutdown isn't just a tool for suppressing protests. It's a tool that affects everyone, and the costs are borne across the entire population.

The Path Forward: What Could Change

International pressure has had limited success in preventing internet shutdowns. Strong statements from the United States, European countries, and international organizations haven't stopped countries from implementing them. Economic sanctions focused on shutdowns specifically haven't been implemented at the level that would change government behavior.

One potential path forward is through internet infrastructure companies. If Cloudflare, Verizon, Akamai, and other companies that operate global internet infrastructure made it their policy to pull services from countries that implement shutdowns, that could create an economic cost significant enough to influence behavior. But this would require coordination across competitors and would face lobbying pressure. So far, companies have been willing to operate in countries with shutdowns while documenting them.

Another potential path is through technical infrastructure. If access to internet were more decentralized, if connections weren't as dependent on specific national ISPs, if there were more alternative connectivity paths, shutdowns would be harder to implement or maintain. But this would require massive infrastructure investment in ways that developing countries haven't prioritized.

Third, international institutions could develop stronger norms and enforcement mechanisms. The UN has discussed internet freedom. Organizations have published principles. But without enforcement mechanisms, these remain aspirational rather than binding.

The reality is that internet shutdowns will likely continue, particularly in countries with less democratic governance. The tools are becoming more sophisticated, not less. The willingness to use them is not decreasing. Addressing this requires international cooperation, infrastructure innovation, and cultural shifts in how governments view information control. None of these are likely to happen quickly.

Connection to Broader Protest Movements

The Iranian protests and shutdown aren't isolated events. They're part of a broader pattern globally of protest movements responding to economic crisis, and governments responding to those movements with control tactics including internet shutdowns.

When economies experience crisis, unemployment rises, prices spike, basic goods become unaffordable, people protest. This is consistent historically and globally. The form of protest changes, the specific grievances change, but the basic mechanism is consistent: economic stress leads to social mobilization.

Governments facing these protests have learned to fear the coordination enabled by internet connectivity. They've learned that distributed movements coordinated through social media and messaging apps can escalate quickly and are difficult to suppress through traditional police action alone.

So they deploy internet shutdowns. The mechanism is clear, the effectiveness is partial but present, and the cost to the government is the international criticism and the economic impact of lost connectivity. When governments decide that cost is acceptable, they proceed.

The protesters, understanding this, have become more sophisticated too. They organize offline. They use traditional methods. They develop workarounds. It becomes an arms race between government capability to restrict and people's ingenuity to coordinate despite restrictions.

Technical Lessons for Internet Infrastructure Resilience

The Iranian shutdown offers lessons for how internet infrastructure could be designed to be more resilient to intentional disconnection.

Currently, internet connectivity in many countries flows through relatively centralized points. In Iran, there are multiple ISPs but they're all state-controlled, creating a single point of control at the national level. If connectivity flowed through more diverse, decentralized paths, disconnection would be harder.

Mesh networking technologies could create redundancy where if central systems go down, local networks persist. Satellite internet could provide backup connectivity independent of terrestrial infrastructure. But deploying these at scale requires investment and political willingness that most countries lack.

For companies and organizations, the lesson is to have backup connectivity options, not to depend entirely on centralized ISPs for critical functions. For countries, the lesson is that heavy dependence on centralized infrastructure creates vulnerability to government control.

For internet researchers and engineers, the lesson is that building truly resilient internet infrastructure requires thinking about adversarial scenarios where governments might want to shut down connectivity. Most internet architecture doesn't account for this scenario. Building architecture that does would improve resilience.

Comparison to Other Countries' Shutdown Events

How does Iran's shutdown compare to other significant internet disruption events?

In 2019, India implemented an internet shutdown in Kashmir lasting days, affecting 8 million people. The scope was smaller than Iran's, the duration was similar. In 2021, Myanmar's internet was substantially restricted during the military coup and aftermath.

These events have different technical implementations and different political contexts, but they share the pattern of government using internet access as a tool of control during political crisis.

The technical sophistication and completeness of Iran's shutdown places it among the most comprehensive documented shutdowns. The near-total disconnection makes it unusual. Most shutdowns involve selective blocking or throttling. Few are this complete.

Looking At Data Privacy During Crisis

When internet goes down, data privacy becomes complicated. With connectivity restored, people often rush to reconnect, potentially exposing themselves to surveillance or attacks.

There's also the question of what government systems capture during shutdowns. Are they monitoring attempts to access the internet? Are they tracking VPN use? Are they positioning surveillance equipment to capture communications when connectivity returns?

During the 2019 Iranian shutdowns, human rights organizations documented that government surveillance systems were active during the shutdown itself, monitoring people attempting to use workarounds or VPNs. This suggests that shutdowns aren't just about disconnection. They're about creating environments for surveillance and monitoring.

For individuals, the lesson is that internet shutdowns don't mean privacy is protected. It often means privacy is actively threatened.

Conclusion: Internet Freedom as Prerequisite for Freedom Itself

The Iranian internet shutdown serves as a stark reminder that internet freedom isn't a luxury. It's increasingly a prerequisite for other freedoms. The ability to communicate, to access information, to organize, to express oneself, and to coordinate action all depend on internet access.

When governments shut down the internet, they're not just disrupting communication. They're disrupting the infrastructure of modern freedom itself. They're choosing to control information rather than trust their citizens with it. They're choosing security of the regime over security of the people.

The Iranian government's decision to shut down the internet amid economic crisis and protests reveals priorities. It reveals a calculation that maintaining control is more important than allowing free communication. It reveals a fear of information and dissent that's severe enough to accept the economic and reputational costs of a near-total disconnection.

This matters beyond Iran. When governments worldwide see that internet shutdowns are possible, that they can be implemented quickly, that international consequences are limited, that they can suppress protests through disconnection, it influences how other governments think about using the same tools.

The pattern is concerning. Internet shutdowns are becoming more common, not less. They're becoming more sophisticated. They're becoming more normalized. If this trend continues, internet freedom will become a privilege of wealthy countries with strong democratic institutions, while authoritarian regimes maintain populations in varying degrees of digital isolation.

Resistance to this requires multiple approaches: international advocacy, technical infrastructure development, economic consequences for countries implementing shutdowns, and cultural shifts in how we view information control and government accountability. It requires recognizing that internet freedom isn't separate from human rights. It's central to them.

The people in Iran who woke up Thursday evening to discover they couldn't reach the internet, couldn't communicate with family, couldn't access information, couldn't coordinate, understood this intimately. The shutdown was meant to suppress them. But it also revealed to the world exactly what their government fears most: free communication and the ability of people to organize and access truth.

FAQ

What caused the internet shutdown in Iran?

Iran implemented a near-total internet blackout in response to nationwide protests that erupted following a sharp currency devaluation. The rial's collapse created immediate shortages of goods and dramatic price spikes that affected ordinary people's ability to afford basic necessities. As protests spread through major Iranian cities, the government deliberately shut down internet connectivity to prevent coordination among demonstrators and stop information about the protests from spreading.

How do internet monitoring firms detect shutdowns in real-time?

Companies like Kentik, Cloudflare, NetBlocks, and IODA monitor internet traffic globally. When a country's internet traffic suddenly drops 90% or more within minutes, these monitoring services detect it immediately through tracking international data flows, BGP routing changes, DNS queries, and connectivity patterns. These firms provide public dashboards and reports showing exactly when shutdowns occur and their magnitude, creating independent verification that's difficult for governments to deny or obscure.

How complete was Iran's internet blackout during the shutdown?

The shutdown was near-total, with internet connectivity dropping 90-99% within minutes. Multiple independent monitoring sources confirmed that Iran was "effectively completely offline." While a small amount of traffic persisted (likely government infrastructure and critical systems), public internet access for the 90 million population was essentially completely severed. This represented one of the most comprehensive internet shutdowns documented, going beyond selective blocking to nearly complete disconnection from global networks.

Why would a government shut down the internet during protests?

Governments use internet shutdowns as a protest suppression tool because they break the coordination infrastructure modern movements depend on. Without internet connectivity, protesters can't use messaging apps to organize new demonstrations, can't share videos of government violence on social media, can't communicate across different cities to coordinate action, and can't access international news to fact-check government claims. The shutdown limits coordination capability and prevents information about the protests from spreading domestically or internationally.

What was the economic impact of Iran's internet shutdown?

Internet shutdowns create significant economic costs. Studies estimate that a full-day shutdown for a country the size of Iran costs between $10-50 million in lost economic activity, from halted e-commerce and disrupted financial transactions to prevented remote work and lost productivity. This occurred during an already severe economic crisis, compounding the problems rather than solving them. The government's decision to implement the shutdown despite these costs reveals it prioritized political control over economic protection.

Is internet shutdowns a common practice globally?

Internet shutdowns are increasingly common but remain concentrated in countries with authoritarian governance or less democratic institutions. Organizations tracking internet freedom have documented over 200 significant internet disruption events globally since 2015. Developing countries experience them far more frequently than developed ones. Iran has implemented shutdowns during previous protest movements in 2009, 2019, and 2020, establishing a pattern of using shutdowns as a standard protest response tool.

Can people communicate during internet shutdowns?

During complete internet shutdowns, internet-based communication becomes impossible. However, people can use workarounds like mesh networking apps (preloaded before the shutdown), satellite phones, radio, or traditional phone lines. But these alternatives are limited, often unreliable, expensive, or easily detected and suppressed by authorities. Complete internet shutdowns remain genuinely disruptive despite technological workarounds. Most people don't have backup communication methods, leaving them without reliable connection to family or access to information.

What happens to data privacy during internet shutdowns?

Internet shutdowns can paradoxically increase surveillance threats. When connectivity is restored, people often rush to reconnect, potentially exposing themselves to phishing, malware, and cyber attacks. Governments may also position surveillance infrastructure during shutdowns to monitor people attempting to use VPNs or workarounds. Documentation from previous shutdowns shows governments actively surveilling citizens during blackouts, suggesting shutdowns create environments for enhanced monitoring rather than privacy protection.

Related Concepts and Understanding Internet Control

The Iranian shutdown represents one example of how governments use internet infrastructure as a tool of political control. Understanding this phenomenon requires understanding how internet architecture works, how governments can manipulate it, and what the implications are for global internet freedom and human rights in the digital age.

Key Takeaways

• Iran implemented a near-total internet shutdown affecting 90+ million people, with connectivity dropping 90-99% in minutes during nationwide protests
• The blackout was triggered by economic crisis: sharp currency devaluation caused goods shortages and price spikes, prompting widespread demonstrations
• Multiple independent monitoring firms (Kentik, Cloudflare, NetBlocks, IODA) detected and documented the shutdown in real-time, making it impossible to deny or hide
• Internet shutdowns are increasingly used by authoritarian governments as protest suppression tools, breaking coordination infrastructure that modern movements depend on
• Global trend shows rising frequency of shutdowns with over 200 documented events since 2015, concentrated in countries with weaker democratic institutions

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